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FINAL CONTRACT SUMMARY REPORT
This report summarizes by task the engineering, technical, and management support
services provided by Vitro Corporation to NASA Headquarters Office of Safety,
Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (now called Office of Safety and
Mission Assurance (OSMA)) (Code Q) under Contract Number NASW-4311 from the
period February 22, 1988 through February 10, 1994.
Each task summary includes significant Vitro accomplishments, conclusions, and
recommendations for future efforts in each of the following divisions within OSMA:
Code Division Name Task Order
QW Engineering and Quality 1000, 4000
Management
QS Safety and Risk Management 2000
,=
OT Payloads and Aeronautics 3000
QV Software Independent 5000
Verification and Validation
QB Quality and Productivity 5000
Programs Improvement Office
QM Resources Management 6000, 7000, 8000
QP Space Flight Safety and Mission 9000
Assurance
DSO SSF Program Office Level II 10000
Safety and Produce Assurance
Office
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1000 SERIES TASK ORDER
QUALITY MANAGEMENT
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
OSMA is the responsible NASA organization for developing and maintaining leadership
for safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance disciplines to assure safety
and mission assurance. This task provides the support necessary in the quality assurance
functions including technical support for the disciplines of mechanical, electrical,
chemical, industrial, systems, aerospace, data systems, and quality engineering, and the
ancillary requirements for effective quality management. This includes functional
management reviews, audits, preparation and dissemination of policy, procedures,
handbooks, and guidelines for the effective organization, development, and operation of
Cl-uality assurance programs. These efforts were conducted under Task 1000. The NASA
Survey/Audit Program Support was initiated under 4300, shifted to 1700, and then to
1000.
This task began in 1988, supporting the Reliability, Maintainability and Quality
Assurance Division. Later this became the Quality Assurance Division, and is currently
(February 1994) the Engineering and Quality Division. The specific programs under this
task include the following efforts:
Quality Assurance: NASA Handbooks (NHBs) and Management Instructions
(NMIs) and Department of Defense (DoD) and International Quality System
Standards.
• Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE).
• Metrology and Cah'bration.
• Materials and Processes.
NASA Mechanical Parts Program Support: Mechanical Parts Control Program,
Fastener Integrity Program, Fastener Quality Act, Mechanical Information
Management System (MEPIMS), Government-Industry Information Exchange
Program (GIDEP), NASA Alert Reporting System (NARS), Supplier Quality
Research and Technology Operation Plan (RTOP), Contractor Metrics Process
Action Team (CMPAT), NASA Continual Improvement Implementation Plan
(CLIP), Assuring Dual Sources for Critical Suppliers, Metric Capabilities of USA
Machine Shops Survey, Cooperation on Quality Problems with NASA Office of
Inspector General (OIG), Small Supplier Quality Assurance Assistance (SSQAA)
Program, Interagency Working Group for Problem Parts and Suppliers,
International Coordination Meetings.
NASA Survey Audit Program Support: Task Initiation, Implementation, Survey
Activity, FMR Transition.
The survey subtask evolved through design, implementation, and execution of Field
Installation on-site surveys by Headquarters, coordination and analysis of corrective
action reports, and tracking and closure reports for individual surveys. This evolved into
a process where the Field Installations would conduct local surveys and contractor audits
and provide data provided to Headquarters for oversight information. With the Field
Installation agreement to conduct self-surveys, the large Headquarters survey group
activity would be reduced to conducting only small, focused, spot check reviews. The
recent development of the NASA "Functional Management" approach to Field
Installation self-assessments for Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality
Assurance (SRM&QA) functional elements will establish accountability at each
Installation functional manager level. Headquarter_s will retMnoversight responsibility
arid provide Agent} level assurance for SRM&QA to the Administrator. The task order
support function also supports the internal Headquarters Functional Management Task
Team and related subtask team activity due to Code Q participation and subtask
coordination functions. The subtask team activity involved revision of the NMI 1240.3
on Functional Management and development of self-assessment evaluation instruments
to assess the overall effectiveness of the new Functional Management initiative
throughout the Agency.
II. SUMMARY OF THE TASK ACTIVITY
Vitro assembled an interdisciplinary team with the necessary training, experience, and
specific expertise to provide innovative, progressive, proactive support to the NASA
SRM&QA efforts in the task areas. Working closely with their NASA counterparts,
Vitro team members developed, organized and recommended implementation
methodologies, new and revised policies, procedures, assessments, technical
documentation, reviews, and new and restructured working groups to maintain and
improve the Agency SRM&QA program. Specific details are contained in the task
summation that follow.
QUALITY ASSURANCE
NASA Handbooks (NHBs) and Management Instructions (NMIs)
The NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 1270.2A, "NASA Quality Policy," was issued
on October 11, 1991. The revision/rewrite, NMI 1270.2B, was issued on December 22,
1992. These documents delineated policies and responsibilities for assuring that NASA
procures, designs, produces/manufactures, maintains, and operates products and services
that conform to requirements and result in mission success. All Code QR and QW
programs contain tasks directed towards implementing this NASA Quality Policy.
Technical procedures, standards, policy, and concepts differ from NASA programs to
programs and from NASA Field Installation to Installation. Vitro continuously assessed
the documentation to identify cross-program generic elements, program-unique
procedures, and quality elements which could be enhanced/improved. From these
assessments, recommendations were developed to provide standardized NASA
Agencywide plans, instructions, and procedures. Vitro has assisted NASA Headquarters
Code QR/QW in the formulation, generation, coordination, and maintenance of the
draft NASA publications, as directed.
The effort to provide a compendium of commonly used safety, reliability, maintainability,
and quality assurance definitions to ensure standardized assurance communications
among NASA Field Installations, Headquarters, and contractors culminated with the
delivery and publication of the NASA Handbook, NHB 5300.4(1G), "NASA Assurance
Terms and Definitions," in May 1993. This document was the result of extensive
research into NASA and Department of Defense (DOD) sources/usage of terms, and
coordination within the Agency.
As a result of the review of existing NASA Handbooks and the direction to continuously
improve the NASA procurement procedures and the effective use of resources, an effort
was initiated to enhance the NASA Handbook, NHB 5300.4(2B-1), "Quality Assurance
Provisions for Delegated Government Agencies." The requirement to standardize
management of Government Quality Assurance functions to provide the minimum
oversight and effective use of resources established the precedence for developing the
revision of the Handbook. NHB 5300.4(2B-2), "Management of Government Quality
Assurance Functions for NASA Contracts," which emphasizes active participation by
NASA and other Agency quality assurance personnel in all phases of contract operations,
was delivered and issued in April 1993 after coordination with the NASA Field
Installations and industry. Training was coordinated, conducted, and completed in May
1993.
The effort to enhance the NASA Handbook, NHB 5300.4(1B), ',Quality Program
Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors," was initiated early in the
contract; however, after extensive coordination with the Headquarters, Installations,
other Agencies and industry, the final draft rewrite, NHB 5300.4(1B-1), "Quality Program
Provisions for Aeronautical and Space Systems," was delivered to Code QR and placed
in a deferred status pending NASA adoption of the American National Standards
Institute/American Society for Quality Control (ANSI/ASQC) Standards for quality
systems as augmented by NASA. Vitro maintains the draft document and makes
distribution when directed. Action was initiated on the associated Handbook, "Guide for
Corrective Action and Disposition System," but was discontinued at the direction of
NASA Headquarters.
In support of the effort to provide program guidance and methodology for structuring
and administering test programs to ensure successful operation of NASA Aeronautical
and space systems, Vitro generated and delivered the draft NASA Handbook, NHB
5300.4(XH), "Test Verification Guidelines for Aeronautical and Space Systems." The
Handbook is being maintained/updated by Vitro while the NASA-wide coordination
cycle is underway.
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Vitro has assisted in the coordination, review, and statusing of the NASA Workmanship
Standards' Handbooks, e.g., NHB 5300.4(3G-1), "Requirements for Interconnecting
Cables, Harnesses, and Wiring," and NHB 5300.4(3A-3), "Requirements for Soldered
Electrical Connections."
Vitro assisted in the preparation/generation and delivery of the NASA Management
Instructions (NMIs); NMI 1270.2A and NMI 1270.2B, "NASA Quality Policy," NMI
5320.X, "Protection and Handling of Electrostatic Discharge Sensitive Items" (Draft), and
NMI 5320.XX, "Configuration Management and Engineering Practices" (Draft). A draft
"Configuration Management Plan/Approach" and schedule were developed and delivered
to Code QR.
Department of Defense (DOD) and International Quality System Standards
Vitro assisted in the-preparation for NASA participation in the-Office of-the A-ssistant
Secretary of Defense (Production & Logistics) International Organization for
Standardization, ISO 9000 Working Group. Recommendations were submitted to NASA
Headquarters for consideration and inclusion in the joint DOD/NASA-HDBK-9000 and
Data Item Document (DID) to supplement ANSI/ASQC Q91 & Q92 requirements and
their use in contracts. Vitro generated and delivered the Appendices A1 and A2 for the
Handbook reflecting NASA unique requirements.
Vitro also assisted the Headquarters in the preparation of recommendations/comments
for the NASA ISO 9000 Working Group which was developing "Augmentation"
comments for ISO 9001, "Quality Systems - Model for Quality Assurance in Design,
Development, Production, Installation and Servicing."
Vitro participated in and assisted in arranging for meetings and discussions, relative to
the ISO 9000 series of quality standards, with other Government agencies (e.g., the
General Services Administration (GSA), the US Postal Service, and representatives of
industry, the Aeronautical Industries Association (AIA), and National Security Industrial
Association (NSIA).
General
Vitro assisted NASA Headquarters, Code QR/QW, in the review and tracking of the
effort on developing "Critical Skills and Certification" training for NASA Quality
Engineers, Reliability Engineers, and Quality Assurance Specialists.
Vitro has participated in and has provided technical and administrative support in
planning, coordinating, and conducting SR&QA related working group meetings, e.g.,
NASA/AIA/NSIA Liaison Group, the NDE Working Group, Met/Cal Working Group,
and symposia, e.g., the annual IEEE Reliability and Maintainability Symposia.
Vitro has supported the review and comment cycle for NASA draft documentation
submitted by NASA Field Installations, e.g., the "Mission Design Process Guide," the
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SAF/AQXM "New Look" paper, and the draft NMI "Problem/Failure Controls for
NASA Payloads." Comments and recommendations were submitted to Code QR/QW.
Vitro's technical support for the NDE, Metrology and Calibration, and Materials and
Processes program areas included in the preparation of procedures and policies,
evaluation of Center and contractor programs, and technical support for technical
meetings. These activities are described in the following paragraphs.
NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
Vitro also participated in the restructuring of the NASA NDE program through the new
NDE Working Group. Technical direction was provided in redirecting the large LaRC
NDE program to be more responsive to NASA program needs. A Code Q committee of
Center representatives was guided in its formation and operations to provide a NASA-
- wide review and coordinatiofi 6fRTOP pi'ogra-ms and submissi0fi_. The NDE program
area was restructured to provide integrated programs, emphasize customer orientation,
consensus decisions, and direct application or transition to field problems.
The multi-million dollar "NDE for Quality Assurance" program at LaRC was brought to
a completion of the build-up of facilities and personnel resources, and then evaluated in
terms of changing objectives, approaches, and individual programs in terms of meeting
stated NASA-WIde program needs. This resulted in a broadening of Code Q support to
other Centers to improve the "Return on Investment" for NDE RTOP programs, which
had not been satisfactory from the viewpoint of the SRM&QA Directors at the NASA
Field Installations.
The Headquarters Oversight Steering Committee was established as a multi-code group
involving Codes M, Q, R, and S to improve Headquarters communication and
coordination of NDE efforts. A comprehensive NDE needs survey was conducted to
provide a basis for new program efforts. The survey was collated and analyzed by a
Vitro-LaRC team of experts and delivered to the Headquarters NDE Oversight Steering
Committee. A series of Technical Interchange Meetings was inaugurated on the ViTS
network for bringing NDE topics and latest state-of-the-art developments to the attention
of Headquarters and field personnel. The basis for a broad restructuring of the NDE
program area was established. Technical support and leadership for all of these
activities was provided under the contract. Stability was provided to the NASA NDE
community and Headquarters Code Q during a time in which there were four separate
NDE program managers. The Vitro technical expertise remained constant during the 5-
year period.
A comprehensivereview and assessmentof the on-orbit NDE and testing requirements
for the Space Station Freedom program was conducted. This included reviewing the
requirements stated in the SSP 30000 basic documents, including the WBS and work
packages, an analysis of requirements and potential NDE techniques suitable for the
space environment, the types of degradation and failure expected during the planned 30-
year life of SSF, and a review of instrumentation used in the Russian Salyut series
vehicles and the Mir space station complex.
Deliverables:
"NASA Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) Working Group Organizational Meeting
Proceedings," Proceedings of Meeting on April 14-16, 1993 at JSC, September 24, 1993.
"Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) Program Restructuring," Status Report, February 22,
1993.
"Nondestructive Evaluation Program Restructuring Goals," Planning Report, November
10, 1992.
"Acoustic Emission Monitoring NDE Initiative Plan," Status Report, September 9, 1992.
"Acoustic Emission Monitoring NDE Initiative Plan," Planning and Status Report, July
22, 1992.
"NASA Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) Oversight Steering Committee Charter,"
March 26, 1991.
"Survey of Nondestructive Evaluation Needs," Technical Report, April 16, 1990.
"Review of LaRC NDE Plan," Technical Memorandum, December 19, 1989.
"On-Orbit NDE Assessment [of] Space Station Freedom," Technical Report, March 31,
1989.
METROLOGY AND CALIBRATION
Technical leadership and guidance was provided for broadening the participation and
interactions of the Metrology and Calibration Working Group, completing the revision of
the NMI for the program area, quantifying the program goals and milestones for the
Measurement Assurance Programs, and improving the process of long range planning.
Technical assistance was provided for revising the "Metrology - Calibration and
Measurement Processes Guidelines" which is scheduled for completion in 1994.
Deliverables:
NASA NMI 5330.9B, "Metrology-Calibration and Measurement Processes," Final Draft,
July 27, 1993.
"Metrology and Calibration Working Group Charter," Final Draft, March 26, 1991.
MATERIALS AND PROCESSES
Under this task specific technical surveys and assessments were conducted and reports
completed. Technical leadership and guidance was provided in the preparation of the
revision of NASA NHB 8060 to produce NHB 8060.1C. Numerous drafts of materials
and processes policy, procedural and process control documents were also prepared and
distributed to responsible Center materials organizations for review. The policy
document has been prepared as a final draft and will be submitted for formal review in
1994.
Vitro reviewed the materials selection and NDE methods used relating to the orbiter
fuel door hinge cracking problem. We also assessed test requirements for Kap_to_n
insulation_ NASA requirements and test procedures were compared with those of the
Aerospace Industry, ASTM, SAE, and the Air Force to determine their ability to provide
realistic data for selection of Kapton-insulated wire and proposed replacements in the
Shuttle and other space applications.
A technical assessment resources study was conducted to compare the personnel
resources devoted to safety, reliability, maintainability and quality assurance (SRM&QA)
functions NASA-wide with those of other major Governmental and Industrial
organizations. This study included over 26,000 NASA employees at Headquarters,
Centers, and JPL, and compared the results with a survey of over 50 industrial,
educational, and laboratory organizations with an aggregate of 263,000 employees, and
non-NASA government agencies, including DOD activities, commissions, laboratories,
and regulatory agencies with an aggregate of 63,000 employees. This is believed to be
the largest such survey ever conducted on SRM&QA personnel resources. The NASA
SRM&QA level of effort did not compare favorably with the overall average for all
industries (5.3% compared with 6.8%), or with other government agencies (10.6%). The
NASA resources devoted to SRM&QA showed a marked decline from the
Apollo/Skylab period (late 1960's to early 1970's) to the time of the study (1989).
Vitro also conducted an analysis of the effects of restrictions proposed by the EPA and
the Montreal Protocol on major sources and area sources emissions (which would
include some NASA Center operations) of solvents, CFCs, and other chlorinated
hydrocarbons.
Deliverables:
NMI 8077.XX, "Selection and Control of Materials and Processes for Space Flight
Programs," July 19, 1993.
NHB 8060.1C, "Flammability, Odor, Offgassing, and Compatibility Requirements and
Test Procedures for Materials in Environments that Support Combustion," Editor and
Contributor, April 2, 1991.
7
Observationson Environment and Etching Proceduresfor Orbiter Fuel Door Hinge
Cracks,"Technical Memorandum, March 19, 1991.
"Kapton Wire Insulation Test Requirements," Technical Memorandum, December 19,
1989.
"SRM&QA Resources Study," Technical Report, February 3, 1989.
"SRM&QA Manning Study," Interim Technical Report, November 18, 1988.
"Impact of Proposed Amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1970 on NASA Flight Safety
Operations," Technical Note, November 2, 1988.
- NASA MECHANICAL PARTS PRO(;_ SUPPORT
Mechanical Parts Control Program
The mechanical parts control program was established to prevent the problems of
counterfeit and fraudulent parts and fasteners experienced by NASA and other federal
agencies during the mid-1980s. Vitro participated in the development, monitoring, and
research that followed the establishment of the program. The following activities are
provided as examples:
Assisted in the establishment of a working group, prepared a charter, and
monitored the many activities addressed during the time period.
Worked as part of the team that wrote, coordinated, edited, and delivered for
publication the NMI 5320.7 "Basic Policy For Mechanical Parts Control."
Fastener Integrity Program
The problem of counterfeit and fraudulent fasteners has caused NASA and other
government agencies to undergo extensive searches, and a large number of fasteners
were required to be destroyed due to the inability to determine which fasteners were
genuine and which were misrepresented. This caused NASA to establish an extensive
fastener integrity program. Vitro was a participant in the following activities supporting
the Code Q organization:
Assisted in the development of a working group, developed a charter and monitored
the specific research programs and technical management programs required to
establish the fastener integrity program.
Was an active participant in the planning and the establishment of criteria to design
and develop a Fastener Information Management System (FIMS).
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Prepared and reviewed a series of position papers on the interpretation of MIL-S-
8879C and assisted in the preparation of the Code Q policy letter, specifically
outlining the responsibilities of NASA Centers and Contractors for dimensional
inspection of both internal and external threaded fasteners.
Monitored the research on finding a replacement for Cadmium as a coating for
space and critical ground support equipment.
Performed literature searches and reviewed company literature for uses of laser
technology to measure thread and fastener profiles without actual contact. This
technology has advanced to the point that the measurements can be made, digitized,
and stored at costs that are competitive with the current methods of establishing
threaded parts profiles. Several presentations were prepared to make the
information available to NASA activities.
Fastener Quality Act
The Fastener Quality Act (PL 101-592) was enacted into law and a Fastener Advisory
Panel was established as required by statute. NASA provided a representative to this
panel and Vitro provided technical and management support for development of
regulations to implement this law. The NIST was responsible for the publication of the
regulation. The draft regulations have been circulated, reviewed and commented upon,
but have not been published. The following facets of the project are identified:
- Reviewed the complete text and background of the law.
- Coordinated NASA comments of the proposed regulations.
- Prepared presentations for the NASA representative.
Maintained a current status of legislation that proposed specific amendments
pertinent to the law.
Mechanical Information Management System (MEPIMS)
NASA recognized the need to have a system of communication to be a part of the
mechanical parts control program and established a project at GSFC to develop such a
system as a part of the NASA Automated System (NAS). Vitro was a vital part of the
planning, design, development, oversight, and technical review and acceptance. The
following highlights are listed:
Assisted in establishing the overall concept and design.
Provided technical review and oversight of the actual construction and testing.
Participated in meetings and telecons, and provided comments on technical progress
reports.
9
Acted as a technical witness for the demonstration and acceptance of the baseline
system.
Coordinated with all NASA Centers and prospective users to ascertain what
functions were required and advised on the prioritization of the development of
these capabilities.
Coordinated with the Mechanical Parts Working Group to prepare a plan to accept
the responsibility for maintaining the system after delivery and to manage the input
of data and selecting the types of data and capabilities required.
Government-Industry Information Exchange Program (GIDEP)
NASA is a sponsor and one of the prime users of the GIDEP system and an active
p afiicipant in the rrio_tofifig of the service pro;eided _,nd the improvements to the
system. Vitro's participation in all facets of GIDEPs included:
Acted as custodian for GIDEP Alerts, Safe-Alerts, Agency Action Notices, Problem
Advisories, Diminishing Manufacturing Sources, and Urgent Information Requests.
Maintained a computerized summary of all GIDEP Alerts, Safe Alerts, Agency
Action Notices for rapid response to requests for data.
Prepared a Monthly Summary of GIDEP data distributed to NASA Centers and
selected contractors.
Participated, and frequently hosted, in the GIDEP Management meetings.
Coordinated with GIDEP representatives on technical aspects of the changes being
made to the computer system that will allow real time, full search capability for all
GIDEP data and provided interface with NASA Centers on service problems.
Acted as Vitro GIDEP representative and performed specialized searches for the
NASA staff as required.
Provided the interface between GIDEP personnel and NASA personnel that are
developing a NASA-wide access to GIDEP and the downloading of GIDEP data.
Maintained a paper copy file of all incoming GIDEP alerts.
Assured that a paper copy of all Safe-Alerts was promptly forwarded to Code QS
for review and possible action.
NASA Alert Reporting System (NARS)
NASA recognized the need for an Alert system that would be responsive, closed-loop,
and closely linked with the G1DEP system. This system is in the final stages of
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development and will become a part of the NAS electronic data system. Vitro has
provided a vital input to the development of this system; a few significant examples are
provided:
Actively participated in the development of specifications, recommended interface
techniques, monitored the software design and development, monitored the
progress, and coordinated with NASA Centers to assure that their needs were
recognized and met.
Participated in telecons, working group meetings, progress reviews, and center
coordination meetings and acted as interface with GIDEP.
Prepared for the Acceptance Test and will act as technical witness for the
demonstration of the operational syste m. _ _ _
As a part of the NARS system, NASA has developed a closed-loop NASA Preliminary
Alert System (NPAS) that gives Code Q a method to rapidly provide NASA Centers with
sensitive and time-critical information. This system allows electronic or hard-copy
transmission to selected center representatives for their action as required. The system
also allows answers to be returned and actions closed when warranted. Vitro was a part
of the development of this system; selected accomplishments are listed:
Assisted in the design of the NPAS and coordinated with the center GIDEP
representatives to assure that needs were being met.
Reviewed incoming information to determine if it was a candidate for the NPAS.
Maintained an overview to assure that the information was being received, actions
taken, and closing reports made.
Vitro assisted in preparing, coordinating, and distributing the following NMIs and NHB:
• NMI 5310.1D, "NASA Alert Reporting of Parts, Materials, and Safety Problems."
NMI 5310.2C, "Participation in the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program
(GIDEP).
NHB 5310.3, "Procedures for NASA Alert Reporting of Parts, Materials, and Safety
Problems"
Supplier Quality Research And Technology Operation Plan (RTOP)
A need was recognized by NASA that some system was required to objectively measure
the performance of suppliers of parts, materials, and services. This RTOP was
established to research the contractor and NASA community to ascertain how
evaluations were being performed and how they could be improved to be more objective
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and standardized between projects and Centers. Vitro has participated in this project,
and some of the inputs are provided:
- Assisted in developing the guidelines in establishing the project.
Coordinated with the Lead Center (JSC) in establishing a working group, a
Statement of Work (SOW), a preliminary plan of action.
Interacted with the working group to reschedule the project to accept related, more
critical projects.
Contractor Metrics Process Action Team (CMPAT)
Mr. Goldin, NASA Administrator, established a requireme_nt to _develop a series of
- metrics for the evaluation of-th-e 30 larg-est I_ASA contracts. These metrics were to be
graphic presentations for use by the Administrator to brief the CEOs of the respective
companies to show them how they are performing on NASA contracts. Code Q was
made responsible for the Quality Metric. Vitro provided the following support in this
effort:
Attended the CMPAT meetings and at times represented Code Q in the meetings.
Coordinated with the Lead Center (JSC) to reschedule work on the Supplier
Quality RTOP and provide inputs for the project.
Assisted in the development of the Quality Metric, participated in the RTOP
Working Group meeting teleconferences, reviewed the draft output, and
coordinated with centers and selected companies on facets of the project.
Reviewed the proposed presentation technique and provided briefings and
coordinated with activities that had problems understanding the Oregon Matrix
technique.
Coordinated with the CMPAT manager (Code H) to assure that the proper
documentation was prepared and submitted to the NASA HQ Associate
Administrators as part of the NHB 2340.4, " Contractor Metrics Handbook."
NASA Continual Improvement Implementation Plan (CLIP)
NASA established a requirement for a plan to assure that the continual improvement
concept was exercised by all NASA activities. Code Q was tasked to provide a section to
the implementation plan on Supplier Quality (Section 6). Vitro assisted in the
preparation and provided the following support:
Coordinated with Supplier Quality RTOP leader to reschedule the RTOP activity
and provide an input for this project.
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- Worked with the working group to prepare the Section 6 input for the CLIP.
- Participated in meetingsto assureproper merging of Section 6 into the overall plan.
Reviewed the Revised Low Award Selection Criteria and made recommendations
to Code Q.
Assuring Dual Sources for Critical Suppliers
NASA was directed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to make an
annual report on the status of single or endangered sources of supply for critical parts,
processes, or services. Code Q has been assigned to collect the reports from all NASA
Program and Project Managers and prepare a consolidated report to OMB. Vitro
participated in this effort in the following areas:
Participated in meetings and briefings from Defense Contract Management
Command (DCMC), a part of Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
Assisted in the preparation of briefings to the HQ Program Managers to describe
the requirements of the report and the possibilities of utilizing support from
DCMC.
Reviewed the DCMC program and the data supplied on their current operation in
performing this task for Department of Defense (DOD).
Metric Capabilities of USA Machine Shops Survey
Congress has mandated that all government agencies develop a schedule to convert to
the use of Metric Measurements as the Primary Unit of Measurement. NASA is
required to make a report to Congress annually on the progress made in this effort.
NASA requested that Vitro conduct a survey to determine the current capability of
machines shops in the USA to provide quality parts in metric dimensions. This survey
was performed and a report was submitted to Code Q. The results of the study were
presented at several meetings and briefings. An abstract of the report was published in a
Metric Measurement Newsletter.
Cooperation on Quality Problems with NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG)
OIG notifies Code Q of any critical quality problems that they detect during their
investigations. These problems are usually sensitive, since the investigation is still being
performed. Code Q is responsible to review these alleged problems and determine if
there is a potential for a problem within any NASA program or project. Code Q uses
the NARS to communicate this information to the proper individuals, yet must protect
the sensitivity of the information. Vitro assists Code O in the evaluation of the
information, preparation of communication to the field, coordination with field activities
during their research, and the preparation of a report back to OIG advising them of the
action taken and the result of the investigation if applicable. In providing this assistance,
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Vitro coordinated with OiG, field representatives, and other agencies to perform
independent research on some of the suspected individuals and companies. Alleged
problems included defective ball bearings, ignition testers, pyrotechnic valves, and
mechanical parts/fasteners. In many of these cases, no problem was detected.
Small Supplier Quality Assurance Assistance (SSQAA) Program
NASA has been encouraged by Congress to provide more of their contracts to small and
disadvantaged companies. The problem that NASA found was that small organizations
did not understand the quality documentation requirements demanded by NASA, and in
many cases were reluctant to attempt to establish the required quality controls and
documentation. In order to assist these prospective government suppliers, NASA
requested Vitro to develop a process that would be simple, educational, economical, and
timely to assist the new supplier in understanding and complying with the government
quality requirementS. Vit_6 took the following actior_: -
Developed a plan, prepared a charter for establishment of a working group,
organized a working group, and scheduled and participated in several meetings with
NASA representatives, Prime Contractor personnel, Professional Association
representatives, and Small Business Agency (SBA) personnel.
Designed, developed, prepared software, created questionnaire, prepared users
manual, and demonstrated the technique to prospective supplier users. This
technique was designed to be used on a personal computer, to be very user-friendly,
and to document the results of the questionnaire directly on a diskette for return
and inclusion in a data base for future use by the government or large industrial
customer. The questionnaire was designed to provide the supplier with insight of
what quality requirements were necessary, and on most occasions why they were
needed, and how to achieve them.
After extensive testing within NASA and with the working group member
organizations, Vitro defined and prepared a final questionnaire, diskette program,
users manual, and mail-out package.
Demonstrated and briefed the program at several NASA Small and Disadvantaged
Business Conferences and provided the attendees with a diskette for their use and
input to NASA.
In cooperation with the NASA working group, SBA was convinced of the merit of
the program, and it was implemented into their Procurement Automated Source
System (PASS). It is currently available nationwide to any PASS member for direct
electronic use as a means of evaluating the quality organization and documented
capability of a prospective small supplier.
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InteragencyWorking Group for Problem Parts and Suppliers
NASA recognized that all Federal agencies were having problems with parts and
suppliers. They decided to take the lead in the establishment of working group of
federal agencies to periodically meet and discuss their problems, exchange sensitive
investigative information, and create a rapport for informal exchange of time-sensitive
information. Vitro assisted in developing a charter, scheduling meetings, providing
technical support for documenting the sanitized meeting minutes, and advising working
group members of NASA points of contacts. The idea was described to OMB and a
letter was prepared by OMB stating that all federal agencies should participate and that
GIDEP be tasked to develop a secure special alert and communication system between
the agency members.
International Coordination Meetings
NASA hosted ESA/NASA and NASDA/NASA meetings at Vitro which were attended
by Vitro representatives. Vitro was tasked to provide meeting minutes and identify all
action items and follow up on the actions taken. The Mechanical Parts action items
were tracked and actions documented.
SURVEY/EVALUATION SUPPORT
The early efforts required analysis of NASA documented requirements that substantiate
the Code Q oversight responsibility stated in NMI 1103.39 based on the organizational
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) functional
requirements. Vitro compiled and delivered to the NASA task manager detailed reviews
and analyses of NASA Management Directives, Program Directives, Code of Federal
Regulations, and Federal Acquisition Regulations. One early task required review of all
previous Engineering Division Reliability and Quality Assurance surveys and Safety
Division surveys for corrective action closure status and provide results with
recommendations for Code Q actions. The previous post Challenger accident Code Q
survey of the Space Shuttle Return to Flight operations at Kennedy Space Center was a
large review effort with status briefings and requests for corrective action status
generated to complete the closures. Items remaining of concern to Headquarters were
identified at each Center and considered for followup review in the new survey cycle.
During the development of survey plans and schedules, the decision to implement the
Field Installation on-site surveys was made. The transition was smooth due to NASA-
contractor coordination; projected planning and implementation schedules were
developed and approved by NASA.
The survey planning was implemented by Vitro with a programmed lead time for NASA
management decisions as to scope, content, manning, timing, and technical support from
Field Installations not being surveyed. The plan was prepared and the Survey Program
Schedule was issued by the Associate Administrator to Institutional Program
Management Codes and Center Directors and Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
Directors. This was an ambitious schedule to survey all Field Installations and the Jet
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Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in a 2-year period. The undertaking was well planned and
executed such that the first survey started as scheduled. The planning, preparation, and
conduct milestones became the yardstick by which all NASA surveys were organized.
The standard scenario consisted of scheduling a meeting of the Code Q Executive
Management Council (Associate Administrator and all Division Directors) to review and
identify the functional areas to be covered by the survey group and to select the survey
Team Leaders. The team membership was selected from Headquarters, Field
Installation, or corporate resources to provide knowledgeable, experienced personnel for
each of the designated survey areas.
Vitro provided all coordination support for facsimile notices, telephone conferences,
video conferences, and various meetings of the Code Q Executive Council, Survey Group
and Team Leaders. In direct support of Code Q, Vitro accomplished the design and
development of planning guides and forms, the receipt and distribution of resource
- material requested from the iTield Ir_tafiations, training presentation of admirdstrative
scenario and data requirements for the survey activity, preparation of draft and final
individual plans, arrangements for on-site hotel meeting facilities, production of draft and
final survey records and reports, tracking, analysis, and statusing of corrective action
reports, and preparation of final closure status. In parallel with the survey planning, a
task was assigned to create a Headquarters documentation tree relating the Quality
Assurance management directives, both NMI and NHB, and the Safety management
directives and federal regulations under Code Q responsibility. The relationship of each
Center's management directives to the Headquarters directives was investigated and
identified. A compilation of the Headquarters and each Center's management directives
was obtained, reviewed, maintained, and used to provide copies to individual survey team
members leading up to preparation for the Center visits.
Performance of this task during the contract term involved a biennial survey cycle
scheduling each NASA Installation and JPL with a full baseline review of all active
SRM&QA functional requirements. The master schedule promulgated by Code Q was
maintained throughout the 2-year cycle with only one revision. This was a change in
sequence for the Kennedy Space Center from the middle to the end of the schedule.
The surveys were coordinated with the NASA Office of Inspector General and the
resident representative at each Installation. The NASA Institutional Program Office
Codes were advised by Code Q Associate Administrator letter as to the master schedule
as well as advance notification before each survey was planned and executed.
Each survey cycle started with a meeting of the Executive Planning Council consisting of
the Code Q Associate Administrator and all Division Directors and the designated
Survey Coordinator. This meeting set the scope of the survey as to Team coverage and
Areas to be Surveyed and recommended individual Team Leaders. Then, a Team
Leaders meeting was held with the Chairman of the survey to further define the Areas to
be Surveyed and select appropriate technical area staff to perform the survey.
Subsequent survey group meetings were held to define the need for reference material to
be requested from the Center and to develop tailored checklists which defined the extent
of the known documented requirements by Federal Law, NASA Directive, and certain
Center and State regulations. A sample of the various meetings leading up to the on-site
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visit were videotaped, and a training video was produced for Code Q. This video was
used to conduct training orientation for new NASA personnel who had not been exposed
to the survey process during the preparation phase for each survey.
The survey approach, on-site requirements, and lodging accommodations were
coordinated by the contractor for the entire survey group. An on-site organizational
meeting was scheduled for the participants the evening before the start date at the hotel
to check last minute arrangements and ensure all non-Headquarters participants were
coordinated with their team leader before arrival at the Center.
During the on-site survey, the contractor provided a survey coordinator and
administrative assistant to support the various team members in preparing typed Survey
Records and access to reference documents. One innovative technique that was
implemented and used to support a larg_e v_olume of typing was the use o_fNASAMail to
t_:ansmit files between Washington, D.C. and the Center. HanclxT_,ritten drafts were sent
by facsimile to the contractor facility, typed as individual record files, concatenated into
one file, and sent via NASAMail addressed to the administrative assistant who
downloaded the file and printed the final Survey ReCords for signature by the Center
Contact, Surveyor, Team Leader, and Chairperson before the survey group departed.
This provided a clear understanding of the discussion and recommendation entries by
both Center and Headquarters participants. Within a week after the survey, the draft
summary report sections were written and formatted by the contractor for review by
Headquarters and sent to the Center for comment as to technical accuracy. The final
report was then prepared for issue by the Associate Administrator to the Center, the
Inspector General Office, and the Institutional Program Office. The Survey Records
identifying Observations and Findings were organized into data packages and a computer
data base was developed that provided status reports by various breakdowns. One report
provided a listing of only Survey Records which were overdue based on the Estimated
Due Date and was provided to NASA surveyors, team leaders, and the chairperson for
emphasis to the respective Center.
A Center-approved SR&QA Corrective Action Plan was requested within 30 days after
the final report was received and became the basis for the closed loop corrective action
system. The individual response to each Survey Record was provided by Code Q to the
contractor, and the assigned Survey Coordinator separated each response by surveyor
and team and formulated a package for the NASA Survey Chairman to send by memo to
the survey members. The memo requested the author's and Team Leader's assessment
of the Center response with recommendation as to closing or not closing the Survey
Record. Survey Corrective Action Plan Status Reports were prepared for response to
the Center via NASA correspondence. The data base maintained all actions dated from
conduct of the survey through the date of closure. The data files were updated routinely
and provided to the NASA Division Director biweekly. The status reports identified
Center, Date, Team Leader, Survey Record Number, Subject, Corrective Action
Acceptance or Rejection Date, Estimated Completion Date, C/A Received from Center,
and Team Leader and Division Director Approval Dates for closure.
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The Center surveys and respective milestone dates are:
SRM&QA SURVEY PROGRAM
NASA SURVEY FINAL RECEIVE ACCEPT SURVEY
CENTER DATE REPORT CAP CAP CLOSED
llll r |1
JSC/rWSTF 11/89 1/90 3/90 4/90 8/91
MSFC 1/90 3190 6/90 9/90 3192
SSC 3/90 5/90 6/90 7/90 1/92
MSFC RO 3/90 5/90 7/90 9/90 1/91
JPL 5/90 8/90 10/90 1/91 10/92
GSFC 8/90 10/90 2/91 5/91 10/92
-- LaRC - -2/_)f 4/91 5/91 7/91 12/93
LeRC 5/91 7/91 8/91 10/91 4/93
DFRF 7/91 9/91 10/91 2/92 12/93
ARC 8/91 10/91 11/91 2/92 5/93
KSC (FMR) 11/91 3/92 5/92 8/92 OPEN-1
In addition to the Survey Report, the Vitro survey coordinator was instrumental in
consolidating specific commendations and additional information from the surveyors that was
considered to be a Lesson Learned. These items were drafted and formatted into a Lessons
Learned Report and distributed to each Center SR&QA office for information and possible
incorporation as desired.
All individual Survey Records and Center responses were filed for a permanent NASA
record. At the termination of this contract, all Center surveys are closed except the last
survey. The last survey was a Functional Management Review conducted at Kennedy Space
Center in November 1991, and only one action recommendation is being held open. The
open item is a large management reorganization and consolidation of the payload assembly
process documented by both McDonnell Douglas procedures and NASA procedures. These
procedures are used on the same assembly line by different employees and have different
requirements and procedural activity that is being consolidated to increase efficiency and
avoid possible confusion. The estimated completion date is June 1994.
With the Kennedy Space Center activity beginning the new concept of a Functional
Management Review (FMR), NASA Code Q began to formulate plans to evolve to functional
reviews in place of the full SRM&QA Surveys. The NASA Office of the Administrator was
advancing the reorganization of the Function Management Program previously defined but
never adequately implemented nor effectively utilized by the large cross-section of NASA
management. There were at least two Headquarters Task Teams that started the
reconstruction of the NMI. In the second group, reorganized after a change in senior
management, the contractor supported both the coordination of the Headquarters Task Team
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participationby CodeQ and the individual CodeQ establishmentof a Functional
Management Initiative in collaboration with all the NASA Center SR&QA offices.
The early effort involved formulating a draft FMR Guidelines strawman document and
sending it to each Center SR&QA office for comment. There were a couple of telephone
conferences to discuss the Code Q/Center approach, and the Code Q manager assigned to
this item was changed three times. The Headquarters Task Team formed a subtask team to
define the Roles and Responsibilities of each management entity. The contractor support
continued and the effort expanded to provide coordination for the next Headquarters subtask
team that was assigned to draft the revised N/vii 1240.3 implementing the rewritten roles and
responsibilities. The review comments and modifications were maintained and provided by
Code Q to Code J for final approval and distribution.
During the last two task order periods, the coordination between Headquarters and the
Ce_ters was solidified tO implement a direct approach-to the Furicfional Management Self-
Assessment Initiative. The Headquarters revision to the Functional Management Program
was recommended to Vice President Gore's National Performance Review as an example of
"Reinventing Government" and was accepted as one of the NASA Laboratories. Code Q is
using the Functional Management Initiative Working Group to implement the self-assessment
concept and individual Center accomplishment. The Center implementation plans are used to
report the Code Q status via Code J to the Administrator. The working group collaboration
is ongoing and will be pursued rigorously in the future to ensure that the revised program
achieves the desired success and that programmatic weaknesses are identified and corrected.
ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL (EEE) PARTS
Vitro personnel have contributed to the development and implementation of an effective
NASA program for Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts. (EEE parts
was a subtask under the Task Order 1000 Series until 1993; see Task Order 4000 for the
most recent EEE parts activity.) Support has been provided in such areas as: the preparation
and integration of EEE parts program documentation; organization, support, and participation
activities for meetings, committees, and working groups; support of the review and
integration of Research Technical Operating Programs (RTOPs); development and
preparation of presentations and a film on NASA EEE parts programs and activities; support
to and participation in field installation surveys; and parts investigations, analyses, reports,
and database activities. The highlights of the activities performed for the EEE Parts Program
task are summarized in the following paragraphs.
During the first year, NHB 5300.4(IF), "Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE)
Parts Management and Control Requirements for NASA Space Flight Programs," was
finalized and issued. Vitro contributed to the preparation of the provisions in that document
and coordinated its review and approval by NASA field installations and Headquarters codes.
Subsequently, proposed improvements of key provisions have been prepared and coordinated
based on Inspector General investigations, changes in the state-of-the-art of EEE parts
management practices, and discussions with NASA activities, other government agencies,
and industry associations.
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Vitro alsorevisedthe two key NMIs on EEE Parts. The review, approval, and issuance of
NMI 5320.5B on the "Basic Policy for Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE)
Parts" and NMI 5320.6B on "Implementation of NASA Standard Parts Program" were
accomplished. These documents provide the basic requirements for the NASA EEE Parts
Program.
A working group was organized and monitored to develop new and revised NASA NHBs on
standard electronic packaging workmanship requirements. Vitro then coordinated the final
review, approval, and issuance of the documents. These NHBs included "Requirements for
Soldered Electrical Connections," "Requirements for Interconnecting Cables, Harnesses, and
Wiring," "Requirements for Crimping and Wire Wrap," "Requirements for Printed Wiring
Boards," "Requirements for Conformal Coating and Staking of Printed Wiring Board and
Electronic Assemblies," MDesign Requirements for Rigid Printed Wiring Boards and
Assemblies," "Requirements for Surface Mount Device Assemblies," and "R_equirements for
-(_ontrol of Electrostatic Sensitive Devices."
Efforts were also undertaken to promote the joint development and utilization of documents
with other government agencies and industry associations. Vitro made numerous
comparisons of NASA documents with key industry and government documents covering
similar requirements and contributed to discussions with the AIA, NSIA, and Department of
Defense to promote joint use of standards for EEE parts management, soldering, and
electrostatic sensitive devices. Also, efforts were initiated to help develop a revised version
of the Air Force Space Division MIL-STD-1546 on Requirements for Management of Parts,
Materials, and Processes which may provide integration of requirements now contained in
NHB 5300.4(1F). Recently, Vitro contributed to the preparation of a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Air Force Space Division to jointly utilize standard documents in the
future.
Vitro provided key technical and organizational support to meetings of NASA personnel,
meetings with other government agencies and industry organizations, and meetings with the
European Space Agency (ESA) and the National Development Space Agency of Japan
(NASDA) on EEE parts. This included preparing meeting agendas and reports, organizing
and coordinating the meetings, providing facilities, acting as a member of the NASA
Headquarters team, and contributing technical advice and consultation.
Vitro was instrumental in organizing a NASA Parts Steering Committee to provide
coordination and interchange of information among NASA field installations. Meetings of
the steering committee were organized and coordinated at Vitro facilities and at Goddard
Space Flight Center (GSFC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC), Lewis Research Center (LeRC), Langley Research Center (LaRC), and the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Recently, the importance of the steering committee was
enhanced by providing it with the responsibility of approving and managing the efforts of the
Research Technical Operating Programs for EEE parts.
Key working groups of the NASA Parts Steering Committee were also organized and
coordinated. A working group on radiation has been successfully organized to coordinate the
important efforts in this area at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the Goddard Space Flight
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Center. Otherworking groupscover partsdatabases,Monolithic Microwave Integrated
Circuits (MMIC), advancedmicroelectronics,andstandardization.
Vitro hasalso participatedin andcontributedto joint partsmeetingswith theESA and the
NASDA. Two meetingsbetweenESA andNASA were hostedby Vitro, key Vitro
participationwasprovided,and meetingminutesandaction itemswere preparedand issued
by Vitro. Also, Vitro personnelrepresentedNASA Headquartersat anESA Parts
Conferencein Noordwijk, Netherlands,presentinga paperon NASA activitiesand programs.
Vitro also hostedtwo meetingsbetweenNASDA and NASA, providing key participationand
coordinationactivities.
A joint committeeof participants from NASA and the AIA and NSIA industry associations
was organized, with several meetings hosted by Vitro. Participation was provided by Vitro
in an EEE parts working group. Procedures were set up so that NASA documents_ could be
forwarded to the NSIA and AIA representatives to obtain coordinated industry comments on
NASA documents and standards.
Vitro also supported the participation of NASA representatives in a Space Parts Working
Group that meets annually to provide interchange of parts information. The working group
is jointly sponsored by NASA and the Air Force Space Division and includes participation by
representatives other government agencies and from all major space industry contractors,
subcontractors, and parts manufacturers. Organization of a NASA presentation for several
meetings was organized and coordinated.
Recently, a United States Space Parts Committee was organized as an outgrowth of the Space
Parts Working Group to review and improve space parts practices, procedures, and activities.
Vitro personnel have supported the committee at the request of NASA, providing members
of several working groups and helping to present the NASA viewpoint in deliberations and
documentation.
Vitro personnel also provided support at meetings related to EEE parts sponsored by other
NASA Headquarters offices and jointly prepared and presented papers with NASA personnel.
These included a Space Transportation Conference at Williamsburg, VA, and a Memory
Device Utilization Conference at Columbia, MD. Vitro representatives also periodically
participated in meetings of the Space Station Parts Advisory Board and at meetings on parts
problems related to the Space Shuttle, Mars Observer, the Hubble Space Telescope, and
other projects.
NASA Headquarters provides significant funding to field installations to have their
contractors develop and implement research technical operating programs (RTOPs) to
provide improvements in EEE parts reliability, standardization, and technology utilization.
Vitro has significantly aided the NASA EEE parts manager in selecting, monitoring, and
managing the development and implementation of such programs.
A major RTOP involves parts standardization and data base activities at the Goddard Space
Flight Center through a NASA Parts Project Office (NPPO). Vitro was instrumental in
organizing meetings at Goddard at which the NASA personnel and their contractors who are
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part of the NPPOprovided presentationson the statusof their activities. Also, supportwas
provided in reviewingNPPO reportsandactivities andproviding consultationto NASA
Headquarterson effectivenessand recommendationsfor improvementsand activitiessuchas
theissuanceand updatingof theNASA StandardPartsList MIL-STD-975 andcommentsto
MIL parts specificationsusedby NASA.
A numberof RTOPson advancedtechnologiesare beingconductedat the JetPropulsion
Laboratory. Vitro hasaccompaniedNASA Headquarterspersonnelon numerousvisits to
JPL to review the statusof the programs. Vitro recommendedthe initiation of an Advanced
MicroelectronicPartsProgramto provide recommendationsto NASA projectsor reliability
of devicesin new technologiesand recommendationsasto their use. This programhas
resultedin a major addition to MIL-STD-975, with Vitro supportingits integrationwith the
NPPO. Vitro also significantly contributed to the development of other JPL programs such
as Radiation, Test Structures, an ASIC Manual, XTRay insI _xc_tion o_f metallization,and
suriXce mount techno|ogy. --
Vitro has participated in yearly reviews of presentations by the RTOP managers and has
provided recommendations for improvements and development of new programs. A database
development program at the Lewis Research Center and a joint Microwave Monolithic
Integrated Circuit program by Johnson Space Center and the Jet Propulsion laboratory are
examples of successful programs which Vitro helped organize and put into effect.
NASA Headquarters also funds the Naval Surface Weapons Center at Crane, Indiana, to
provide EEE parts activities. Vitro has provided significant actions in monitoring the NSWC
efforts and recommending new and improved support activities. Vitro personnel participated
in a visit to Crane and participated in periodic meetings to review status and plans. Visits to
the Air Force Rome Laboratory and the Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC) also had
significant participation by Vitro personnel.
One of the initial tasks provided to NASA as part of the EEE parts program support was the
preparation of a videotape on NASA EEE parts activities. Vitro personnel scripted the
videotape and produced it, providing significant clips of EEE parts organizations and
activities at NASA Headquarters, Goddard Space Flight Center, and Jet Propulsion
Laboratory. The videotape was distributed to and presented at all NASA Field installations
and to several Government agencies and contractors. The NASA EEE Parts Program
videotape was praised by most viewers and is often used as an example of the type of v
videotape other activities should prepare. It is periodically shown on NASA Select.
Many technical presentations and papers were prepared for NASA parts personnel for
meetings, conferences, and briefings. Major presentations and associated technical papers
were prepared for the NASA Space Transportation Conference and the ESA Parts
Conference. Vitro also prepared briefings for meetings of the NASA Parts Steering
Committee, the Space Parts Working Group, and meetings with Government Agencies and
Industry. Briefing charts were prepared for many other meetings and periodic reports to
management on a continual basis, as often as every week. Vitro personnel developed,
prepared, and presented briefings on a program to streamline the management EEE parts by
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minimizing NonstandardPartsApproval Requestsand utilizing major space contractor parts
management programs and parts lists.
Vitro EEE parts personnel also prepared and presented monthly reports to NASA
Headquarters personnel as part of the overall NASA support contract. These included
monthly written status reports and monthly oral presentations.
Vitro personnel participated on the EEE parts teams for the NASA Headquarters product
assurance surveys of Field Installations. Support was provided in development of checklists,
preparation of reports, and resolution of findings resulting from the surveys. Significant
participation was provided at many of the survey sites, including Marshall Space Flight
Center, Lewis Research Center, and Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
A key aspect of the survey support was the synergy with other Vitro members of survey
teams. Many of the findings Were ap-plicable to several areas, an_l-Vitro effoffs tiel_ form
a bridge between the areas. Also, the survey participation provided significant relationships
for Vitro personnel with NASA personnel at the Field Installations. These relationships were
important in providing support for many of the other tasks associated with the EEE parts
program.
Vitro personnel performed or participated in parts investigations and analyses, resulting in
the preparation of reports with significant findings and recommendations. The efforts were
related to general problem areas such as GIDEP alerts, Inspector General investigations, and
data base development, as well as project-related investigations for the Space Shuttle, Mars
Observer, Hubble Telescope, Space Station, etc.
An important aspect of the EEE parts program task was related to GIDEP alerts. Continuous
review of all GIDEP alerts on EEE parts was conducted, and monthly summaries of the
alerts were prepared and distributed to Headquarters and Field Installation personnel. These
summaries were included in parts newsletters which were distributed by the NASA Parts
Project Office to NASA Field Installations and contractors. Also, many requests were
received from NASA Headquarters personnel to perform specific searches of GIDEP alerts
for specific parts and part manufacturers and to provide summary reports on the searches.
Vitro personnel supported investigations and analyses related to Inspector General findings.
We provided reportsand consultative advice for investigations of fraud related to items such
as resistors, circuit breakers, and semiconductor devices. Significant contributions were
made to testimony provided to Congressional committees by the NASA associate
administrator. Also, support was provided in meetings pertinent to the investigations with
representatives of the Inspector General and other NASA Headquarters offices and Field
Installations.
Vitro supported many parts investigations related to specific projects. Vitro personnel
participated in meetings on significant problem reports and provided recommended actions to
teams formed to investigate specific problems. One effort was the review and discussions of
proposals for the Space Station use of commercial parts and Class B parts. Inputs were
provided to the team investigating hybrid microcircuit reliability in gyroscopes used on the
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Hubble Telescope. Recommendationswereprovided in the investigationof possible sensitive
switch failures related to Goddard Space Flight Center projects. Recent efforts were
significant in supporting the Mars Observer investigation of possible failures of transistors,
tantalum capacitors, and microwave devices.
Another task Vitro performed was related to the development of databases for EEE parts.
Reviews were made of the efforts and outputs of the NPPO development of the EEE Parts
Information System (EPIMS), including participation in meetings and demonstrations. Also,
Vitro personnel were instrumental in the development of a Folio-based data system which
provides for the full-text search of reports from such sources as GIDEP alerts and the JPL
radiation data bank.
Specific general problem investigations were performed by Vitro personnel and reported on
to personnel at NASA Headquarters and Field Installations. An example of this was a major
investigadori-of failure modes of Philips res_siors related to their use in NASA projects.
Ill. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
NASA should consider having a single parts, materials, and processes program incorporating
activities currently included in the Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanicai Parts;
Mechanical Parts; Materials and Processes; Electronic Packaging; Non-Destructive
Evaluation; and Metrology and Calibration Programs.
As this contract closes, the Functional Management Self-Assessment Initiative is programmed
to be implemented over the next few years. The Functional Management Program is very
important to NASA. It ensures that suspected material weaknesses and problems are
resolved and positive results are shared. Accomplishing the oversight functions improves or
corrects each functional discipline or process. Code Q defined responsibility for Functional
Managers at Headquarters and Field Installations and established the initiative at the
Installation level. While continuing to pursue the initiative at the institution level, Code Q
must emphasize the Headquarters program manager oversight assistance and involvement.
There should be a uniform format for reporting self-assessment activity including results of
both corrective actions and beneficial lessons learned, so that the individual Center reports
may have recognizable commonality. Code Q should ask the Self-Assessment Working
Group to define a common data base and oversee its creation, distribution, and operation to
catalog and track self-assessment results at each installation. This will give the Center
Directors and the Headquarters management a uniform view of the Center activity reports.
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2000 SERIES TASK ORDER
SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
From the beginning of the contract, the impetus of the 2000 series task orders has been
to provide oversight over the safety aspects of the Space Flight Programs and over the
institutional safety programs throughout the 9 NASA Field Installations. A major part of
those efforts included creation of new safety manuals and revision of existing ones.
Typically, the 2000 series task orders provided four types of technical support to the NASA
Headquarters Safety and Risk Management Division (formerly the Safety Division):
Analysis and assessment of selected NASA systems to ensure compliance with
applicable safety standards -- systems such as space nucl-ear power systems, the
Space Station, the Space Shuttle, Unmanned Launch Vehicles, and payloads for both
launch systems.
Safety assessments to ensure institutional compliance with safety standards,
regulations, and legislated codes/consensus standards. The span of effort included
safety of flight explosives and ground support operations unique to spaceflight,
facility design and operation, occupational safety, fire protection, aviation safety,
and hazardous materials handling.
Development of new policies, manuals, training courses, tools, and techniques.
Included were such items as the basic safety policy for the Space Exploration
Initiative; improved methods for performing Software Safety Analysis, Human
Engineering Safety Analysis, and Risk Assessments; 3 computer-based systems for
the NASA Safety Information System; automated support tools for creation and
maintenance of Code QS safety documentation; 30 new safety manuals and NMIs;
revisions to 16 existing safety manuals and NMIs; and 4 new safety training
courses.
Establishment and maintenance of the Code QS technical library in a configuration
that would permit quick access to safety reports and correspondence by Code QS
personnel and to the databases for tracking problems and extracting pertinent data
for evaluation by QS engineers.
H. SUMMARY OF TASK ACTIVITY
This task order has consistently comprised 16 distinct areas:
Payloads System Safety Analysis*
Space Transportation System (Space
Shuttle) Safety Analysis*
Aerosystems and Facilities
Space Station (Freedom) Safety*
INSRP (Nuclear Power System
Safety) Support
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NSIS (SafetyInformation Systems)
Development
Risk Assessment
SoftwareSafety*
Human(Factors)Engineering*
OSHA Safetyand Fire Protection
Flight and Ground OperationsSafety
(ExplosivesHandling Safetyand
EmergencyPreparedness)
UnmannedLaunch Vehicle Safety
and US System
Safety Library Document and Safety
Data Base (Records) Maintenance
Aviation Safety
Operational Engineering Panel
Safety Documentation Development
and Update
Safety Training Development
With the reorganization of Code Q in 1992, several safety areas (indicated with an asterisk)
were deleted from the 2000 series of task orders, and others were added: Trend Analysis,
System Assessment, Data Systems, and support for prelaun_ch Assessment Reviews.
Throughout the contract, Vitro engineers developed and maintained a keen awareness of
critical issues impacting mission readiness in order to provide technically competent input for
NASA decisions. By continual participation in Design Reviews, Phase Safety Reviews,
Prelaunch Assessment Reviews, meetings of the Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel,
meetings of the DoD Explosive Safety Board, meetings of the Interagency Nuclear Safety
Review Panel, etc., we were able to offer timely recommendations in real time as new issues
surfaced. Our dedication to these tasks was instrumental in moving George Rodney/Q and
Richard Perry/QP to confer a certificate of recognition for _Support to the Office of Safety
and Mission Quality" in June 1990. We succeeded because of participation in the following
reviews, teleconferences, and meetings:
Daily Space Shuttle teleconferences and meetings to stay abreast of Space Shuttle safety
matters.
Daily unmanned launch vehicle tagup meetings to stay abreast of unmanned launch
vehicle safety matters.
Payload Phase Safety Reviews to gain insight regarding the overall health of the
payload safety process.
Facility Safety Reviews to gain insight regarding the overall health of safety processes
for the wind tunnels and other facilities.
Space Station Preliminary Design Reviews to penetrate the complexities of and
problems with its design safety program.
Meetings of the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel to track the progress of the
Program Offices' assessments of radiological risks.
Meetings with NASA's data base users to ascertain the real underlying requirements for
each proposed NASA Safety Information System.
26
Headquarterssurveysof theNASA Field Installationsto determinetheir compliance
with federallymandatedsafetyrequirements.
Project meetings at the NASA Field Installations that are developing new methods for
Probabilistic Risk Assessment midwifing emerging risk assessment technologies.
Meetings with NASA's software developers ascertaining the NASA environment and its
potential impact on the adequacy of the software to provide safety.
Meetings with NASA Field Installation safety personnel working Human Engineering
safety issues.
Meetings with NASA Field Installation safety personnel working suspended load crane
safety issues, pressure vessel recertification issues, OSHA safety issues, etc.
Meetings of the National Fire Protection Association working the Halon alternatives
issue (among others).
Meetings with NASA explosive safety officers working the issues of proper shipping
and storage of chemical energy sources (hydrazine, ammonium perchlorate, and a
variety of small solid rocket motors).
Meetings of the NASA aviation safety officers at all the field installations staying
abreast of aviation safety issues in the NASA environment.
• Various design reviews to obtain information to apply in technical assessments.
Trend Analysis Working Group meetings to gain insight to facets of the major programs
that may benefit from trend analysis.
Meetings of the NASA Reliability and Maintainability Steering Committee to improve
the NASA reliability program.
Meetings with NASA Field Installation safety personnel to gather an understanding of
underlying issues and developing the appropriate wording for revising NHB 1700. I(V-
1), "The Basic Safety Manual."
In addition, the Vitro safety team has completed an impressive number of projects during this
contract period in the following key areas:
Aerosystems and Facilities Safety: Provided updates to the NHB for Aerosystems Safety and
the NHB for Facilities Safety, provided an update to the "Construction Safety" chapter of the
Basic Safety Manual, participated in safety review meetings at three NASA Field Installations
(ARC, I_aRC, and LeRC), participated in wind tunnel project safety audits at these same
three Installations, extracted failure data from the run records of the LaRC 8-foot wind
tunnel in support of the probabilistic risk assessment performed by Code QS and provided a
chapter for the final report explaining how the data was compiled, provided an evaluation
27
report on the DoD Facilities System Safety course, evaluated the safety aspects of wind
tunnel rehabilitation and modification projects and provided comments to Lonnie Owen/QS,
assessed NASA procedures and NASA Field Installation safety assurance programs for wind
tunnel rehabilitation and modification projects, and participated in directors oversight
committee meetings at the NASA Field Installations.
Payload System Safety Analysis: Provided support for a total of 105 payloads; evaluated of
269 payload safety data packages; developed and delivered to Code QS a working draft of
NASA Safety Standard NSS/SY1740.X, "Payload and Cargo Element Safety Requirements";
and evaluated the Commercial Draft Specification of Standard Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle
Interfaces for Medium and Intermediate Size Spacecraft.
STS (Space Shuttle) Safety- Efforts in this area have been outstanding from the beginning.
Our goal has always been to_provide real-time Mission Safety Evaluations at each major
- decision point in the launch flow. The "Special Service Honor Award" conferred on the
Vitro team in July 1990 attests to our success in that endeavor.
We began by establishing a computer-based hazard tracking system. Then for 27 missions,
we prepared and delivered up-to-the-minute Mission Safety Evaluation Reports immediately
prior to each Prelaunch Assessment Review, each Flight Readiness Review, each Flight
Readiness Firing, and each Launch-Minus-2-Day Review. Provided direct support to Jerry
Moore/QS at KSC during each Flight Readiness Review, each Launch-Minus-2-Day Review,
and each Launch-Minus-l-Day Review. Manned the Code Q Management Information
Center for prelaunch support to Code QS at NASA Headquarters and to Jerry Moore/QS at
KSC for problem assessment and resolution during the prelaunch hours for all 27 missions.
Prepared and delivered the postflight editions of the Mission Safety Evaluation Report for 27
Space Shuttle missions. Supported the System Safety Review Panel and Program
Requirements Control Board Reviews for at least one session for each of the 27 Space
Shuttle missions. Provided an update to NSTS 22254, "Methodology for Conduct of NSTS
Hazard Analysis." Developed a new initiative with Code QP and Vitro OSP personnel that
proposed a forum for discussion and presentation of long-term Space Shuttle program
enhancements.
Space Station (Freedom) Safety -- Began this effort by developing a Space Station Freedom
Safety Program Plan, a Hazard Analysis Methodology Report, a Database Requirements
Report, a first draft of SSP 30315, "Space Station Users Requirements Document," and a
first draft of SSP 30309, "Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Requirements." Provided an
evaluation of 37 PDR data packages, and participated in 29 Space Station Freedom Design
Review meetings for which synopsis reports were prepared for Code QS. Provided an
evaluation of 31 Space Station Payload Safety Review Data Packages. Developed proposed
NHB 1700.7C, "Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads." Conducted comparison of
FMEAs and Hazard Reports for the JEM Pressurized Module and Exposed Facility in
support of the JEM PDR. Assisted in the definition of the basic safety policy for the Space
Exploration Initiative. Provided an evaluation of the following documents:
SSP 30XXX, "Space Station Freedom
Integrated Safety Program Plan"
SSP 30599, "Safety Review Process
for Space Station Freedom Program"
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NHB 5300.4 (X), "NASA Assurance
Terms and Definitions"
The Revised SSF MB-06/Stage 6
Integrated Fault Tree
COL-RQ-ESA-027, "COLUMBUS
Product Assurance/Safety Technical
Requirements for Payloads To Be
Integrated into the APM Launch
Configuration"
CR HH900106, "Safety Requirements
Relative to Fail-Safe and Payload
Failure Propagation"
CR BB003198A/SSP 30652, "SSFP
Safety Requirements for On-orbit
Operations"
The Safety Analysis Report for the
Crew Health Care System
NSIS Development: Performed an Independent Verification and Validation of the
software for the Mishap Reporting/Corrective Action System and the software for the
Lessons Learned Information System. Developed a software tool to facilitate buildup of
the Space Shuttle Mission Safety Evaluation Report. Developed a second software tool
to facilitate maintaining an up-to-date Safety Training Catalog. Developed a third
software tool, "The OSMA Document Management System Program," to facilitate
incorporation of comments during the development or update of any OSMA document.
Developed and provided a users guide for each of the three software tools. Worked on
the NASA Code Q budget program software to restore the FY 1992 capabilities that
were deleted when procedure was run to prepare the program to accept the FY 1993
budget data. Participated in NASA Code Q Budget Program Joint Application
Development meetings. Performed technical evaluation and requirements analysis for
elements of the Decision Support System. Performed a technical evaluation of
Relational Database Management Systems versus Text Management Systems for
supporting Code QS information search and retrieval; performed a follow-up study
providing additional detail on full-text, variable-field-text retrieval systems. Completed
development of the Code Q Correspondence Management System concept specification,
the draft Code Q Travel Tracking Program Specification, and the draft Code Q Local
Area Network Management Plan. Developed the Lessons Learned Information System
functional test check list used to control the preliminary verification testing of the
INGRES version of the system.
Provided technical inputs to the system architectural design during in-process
reviews held at the Assurance Data Systems Office, GSFC. Provided technical
input to application development meetings on the Earth Observation System
program development status monitoring, the Reliability Preferred Practices
interface to Lessons Learned proposal assessment, the Potential Issue/Problem
Identification Committee's proposal for an Independent Assessment Catalog
program, and the draft Fastener Information Management System design.
Assisted in bringing three systems through a complete development cycle -- the
Mechanical Parts Information Management System, the EEE Parts Information
Management System, and the NASA Alerts Reporting System. For each of these
three systems we evaluated the draft Requirements Specification, developed a set of
29
test acceptancecriteria to be used with the test procedure, prepared and distributed
the Acceptance Test Traceability Report, worked with the PARAMAX in-house
test team during the software functional verification that preceded the acceptance
test, conducted the acceptance test and the acceptance demonstration, and prepared
the Software Acceptance Test report.
* Downloaded, assembled, and presented data used in Prelaunch Assessment
Reviews. Wrote queries to retrieve detailed problem reports (when required) from
the various NASA problem reporting databases, retrieved pictures from NASA
Field Installations (when required) depicting damaged hardware or defects, and
continuously acquired performance information on newer versions of the data
retrieval equipment, seeking potential system upgrades. Maintained and updated
the charts in the Code Q Management Information Center to reflect several types
of data -- trend analysis charts, technical issues, and generic trending. Drafted a
.... document desc-ribi-ng-the entire Prelaunch As-sessment Review process, including
data creation, transmission, and display guidelines and requirements. Participated
in a working group for automating the process of providing data support for the
Prelaunch Assessment Reviews.
Provided an evaluation of the Assurance Data Systems Office Software
Development Guide, the requirements for the EEE Parts Information Management
System, and the draft Concept Specification for the NASA Assurance Information
System. Conducted Customer Acceptance Testing for the EEE Parts Information
Management System and prepared the test report.
INSRP Support:. Supported the development of the Safety Evaluation Report for both
the Galileo and the Ulysses missions. Because these efforts had been forced into an
extremely optimistic schedule, the production of these two reports to the White House
required a great deal of close order drill in the final weeks. The degree of professional
support provided by the Vitro team led to a letter of commendation from Chuck Mertz
(then Director of the Safety Division) "for Outstanding Support to the Interagency
Nuclear Safety Review Panel."
In addition to providing continual suggestions for evaluating radiological risks, the Vitro
team made a number of significant contributions. Provided the minutes for several
meetings between the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel and the Program Offices
for the Galileo, Ulysses, Cassini, and TOPAZ Missions. Provided technical input to
Launch Abort Subpanel meetings and Power System Subpanel meetings (in fact, the
Power System Subpanel conferred recognition on the Vitro team via an
acknowledgement in their subpanel report for the Ulysses mission, "For material
contributions to several working meetings.") Completed an NMI on the use of
radioactive materials in space and updated the chapter of the Basic Safety Manual
dealing with the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel and the process for evaluating
radiological risks of missions that use nuclear power systems. Provided an evaluation of
the following items:
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The Final Safety Analysis Report for
the Galileo Mission
Several versions of the TITAN IV
Databook developed by the Cassini
Program Office
The Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generator Safety Assessment for the
Cassini Mission
The Final Safety Analysis Report for
the Ulysses Mission
The DOE Overall Safety Manual
The TOPAZ II Preliminary Safety
Assessment Report
The Cassini Mission Environmental
Impact Statement and its supporting
studies
The Cassini Mission Earth Swingby
Analysis
The draft test report, "Feasibility -
Investigation for Performing Fireball
Temperature Tests"
The Environmental Assessment for
the Mars Environmental Survey
Pathfinder Mission
The draft document, "Launch-
Approval Process Guidelines"
Risk Management: In this area, Vitro was a major player in assisting Code Q in
introducing to the NASA Field Installations the newly emergent technology for
performing risk assessments using statistical methods. Our efforts won a letter of
recognition "For outstanding risk assessment support to the Risk Assessment Office" in
August 1990 and a second such letter "For exceptional support to the probabilistic failure
analysis assessment team" in January 1992.
Assisted in the Code QS development of a workshop to disseminate newly evolved
methodologies for Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Developed and executed a plan for
enhancing the existing hazard analysis methods for the Space Shuttle. Provided extensive
input into the INSRP uncertainty analysis for the evaluation process on the Ulysses
mission. Evaluated several commercially available software programs for use in
probabilistic risk assessment of system failure scenarios. Provided a position paper to
Code QP on the required statistical precision of sample sizes to ensure an upper limit on
uncertainty for their use during their NASA Field Installation surveys. Developed a
prioritization scheme for Space Shuttle risks. Performed an evaluation of the JPL low-
cycle fatigue estimation software codel Developed NMIs on future space debris
limitations and on risk management requirements. Developed a position paper on
reliability goals for the National Launch System. Developed a proposed revision to the
Space Station Freedom risk assessment worksheet as presented in SSP 30309, "Safety
Analysis and Risk Assessment Requirements." Developed a 3-year Plan for activating
the new risk assessment methodology throughout NASA. Provided an extensive review
and rewrite of the Orbital Debris Handbook initiated by JSC. Coordinated the comment
and rewrite effort for the Orbital Debris NMI and the Risk Management Policy NMI.
Developed a list and rationale for future support projects in Risk Management/Risk
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Assessment. Developed a draft of a probabilistic designsurvey for MSFC and for the
Engineering Management Council. Prepared a general outline for a Risk Assessment
Handbook. Coordinated (with MSFC, LeRC, and Symbiotics Technologies Inc.) the
evaluation of the Workstation (software, databases, and user's guide) being developed
under subcontract to Science Applications International Corporation.
Participated in the joint effort on the uncertainty analysis for loss of berthable attitude
for the Space Station redesign. In particular, developed the debris impact numerics and
model and authored the Extra Vehicular Activity input portion of the report. Reviewed
and modified the briefing and results for final presentation to the Space Station
Transition Team. (The Space Station option assessment was performed in conjunction
with Mike Frank/SFA, SAIC, and two members of Code QS -- Pete Rutledge and Ben
Buchbinder.) Provided an evaluation of the following items:
Solid Rocket Motor-failure rate
quantification refinement
The TrrAN IV Databook
The JPL methodology for
certification of Space Shuttle Main
Engines
The MSFC risk assessment method
for the aero-assist Flight Experiment
The ARC risk assessment for life
support systems
The JSC Space Shuttle assured
availability program
The JPL probabilistic failure
estimation methodology
A statistical analysis for Intelsat
satellite regulator reliability
An assembly risk assessment
document for Space Station Freedom
The response surface methods for
MSFC
An air pallet risk trade study for the
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor
A Range Safety Study performed by
ACTA for the Air Force
The FSAR uncertainty analysis
generated by the Ulysses Program
The MSFC WeiBayes method of
extending risk assessment data
The Code QP method for statistical
analysis for air quality surveys
The JSC integrated risk assessment
plan for Space Station Freedom
The MSFC single-flight-reliability
estimation method
The MSFC probabilistic methods for
factor-of-safety calculations
A FMEA/CIL ranking method
developed by the University of
Virginia
A study on the Space Shuttle orbiter
strut failure probability
The reliability design goals for the
National Launch System
The JPL goodness-of-fit study for the
failure data used in its method
The system requirement design
document for the National Launch
System
The KSC assessment of the JSC
Shuttle assured availability program
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Monthly University of Virginia
reports on Risk Ranking and
Screening
The LaRC method for reliability
trend assessmentof small samples
The JSC Orbital Debris assessment
software
The MSFC review of the JPL
probabilistic failure assessment
method
A proposed JSC Management
Instruction on Risk Management
The JPL electro-optical probabilistic
failure assessmentproposal
Unmanned Launch Vehicles: Performed an evaluation of the Orbital Maneuvering
Vehicle software and provided comments to Lonnie Owen/QS. Initiated effort to
generate a system safety handbook for expendable launch vehicles. Provided prelaunch
planning support as well as support during the final launch countdown for a total of 11
launches on a variety of unmanned vehicles. These efforts included the preparation and
delivery of Mission Success Evaluation Reports immediately prior to each Flight
Readiness Review as well as an update immediately prior to each launch. Completed
preparation and delivery of seven postflight Mission Success Evaluation Reports.
Participated in a number of preflight decision reviews:
Delta/EUVE vehicle-on-stand
review
Mars Observer Project Launch
Readiness Review
Titan III/TOS preflight review
Titan III/TOS/Mars Observer
mission director's Flight Readiness
Review
NASA Headquarters Mission
Readiness Review for
Scout/SAMPEX
Mars Observer Contamination red
team follow-up review
Titan III/TOS/Mars Observer
Mission Readiness Review
Titan III/TOS/Mars Observer
launch management Coordination
Meeting
Human (Factors) Engineering Safety Analysis: Reworked an existing Vitro methodology
for performing human factors safety analysis and provided an Integrated Human
Engineering/Safety Analysis Methodology for application to NASA development
projects. Developed a draft Human Factors NMI, a preliminary NASA Handbook on
Human Factors Safety, and a NASA Safety Standard, "Human Engineering Guidelines
for Safety Assurance." Worked extensively with Code QS and the NASA Field
Installations to initiate Human Factors Safety analysis efforts throughout NASA- a
process that had been totally lacking prior to the onset of Vitro's contract. These efforts
included the development of quarterly human engineering briefings that were presented
periodically to various NASA Field Installation personnel gatherings, the evaluation of
the JSC Human Factors/Safety Training course, and the development of program plans
for a prototype Human Engineering Program and a prototype Human Error Avoidance
Demonstration Program. Also provided evaluation and oversight of the Human Error
Avoidance DemonStration Program. Enhanced a video of the KSC student intern's
presentation of his NASA Human Factors Engineering evaluation. Also edited this
33
video (initially 1 hour and 15 minutes long) to create a 30-minute version and a 10-
minute version for Code QS' use in familiarizing NASA leaders with potential Human
Factors program benefits.
Software Safety: Reworked an existing (pre-NASA contract work) Vitro methodology for
performing software safety analysis and provided a methodology for application to NASA
software development projects. Worked extensively with Code QS and the NASA Field
Installations to initiate software safety analysis efforts throughout NASA m a process that
had been totally lacking prior to the onset of Vitro's contract. These efforts included
participation in software safety audits at the NASA Field Installations, evaluations of
software development plans, participation in working group meetings, preparation and
presentation of briefings and papers, and assistance in the development of safety
requirements for software development design reviews, and participation in Technical
Interface Meetings to establish a safety database for software. Converted an existing set
0f-Vitro software s_ety objectives and provided a set of NAS)ksp-ecific software safety
objectives. Assisted in numerous investigations of anomalous incidents throughout
NASA systems that were found to be the direct result of software coding errors or
software design oversights. Developed a NASA Software Safety Requirements
Document. Developed a software safety standard and completed a software safety status
report to be presented by Code QS to George Rodney/Q. Completed development of a
NASA Software Safety Plan. Completed the draft NASA Software Safety Program plan
and the draft NASA Software Safety Guidelines. Participated in Space Station Freedom
software safety meetings and teleconferences to finalize software safety requirements and
software documentation needs. Provided an evaluation of the following items:
A Space Station Freedom Software The Software Systems Safety
Fault Analysis Requirements Handbook prepared by JPL
Document
The Software Safety Program Plan
prepared by JPL
Aviation Safety: Worked extensively with Code QS and the NASA Field Installations to
ensure adequacy of programs for aviation safety. These efforts included the development
of an NMI on the subject of aviation safety, the development of a chapter on aviation
safety for inclusion in the Basic Safety Manual, the development of a comprehensive
aviation safety officers reference guide, the development of an aviation safety policy
document for Code Q, assistance to Code J in the development of their aviation safety
policy document, the development of a position paper on crew safety, research for Code
QS in preparation for the proposed development of a kit for use by Space Shuttle
mishap investigation teams, the development of a mishap investigation "fly-away" kit to
help prepare investigators and other people involved in accident investigation, the
Preliminary Draft Mishap Investigation Team Administration Manager Checklist of
Duties, participation in the semi-annual meetings of the Intercenter Aircraft Operations
Panel, participation in the periodic meetings of the Interagency Committee for Aviation
Policy, participation in periodic aviation maintenance meetings, participation in periodic
aviation safety reviews at the NASA Field Installations, participation as a team member
during the NASA Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel review of the aviation operations
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at five NASA Field Installations (GSFC, MSFC, DFRF, LeRC, and KSC), and
preparation of a paper that Vitro presented during the annual NASA Aviation Safety
Officers Meeting. Participated in the ARC Aircraft Science and Applications Program
Annual Review meeting. Provided an evaluation of the following items:
Data on the F/A 18 mishap NTSB mishap investigation checklists
Federal Aviation Administration DoD mishap investigation-related
mishap investigation checklists checklists
OSHA and l_re Protection: Worked extensively with Code QS and the NASA Field
Installations to ensure adequacy of programs for facility safety, occupational safety and
health, fire protection, and hazardous material safety throughout NASA. Our effort won
a NASA "Special Service Group Award" in August 1990, a letter of recognition "For
professional support to the SRM&QA s_u_ey at LaRC" in February 1991, and a
Certificate of Appreciation from the Construction Specification Institute "For outstanding
achievements" in October 1991.
The completion and distribution of NHB 1700.1 (V1-B), "NASA Safety Policy and
Requirements Document" was the most significant of these efforts because it will serve
as the foundation for all safety programs at all nine NASA Field Installations ( and
Headquarters) for the next decade.
Efforts included developing a 5-year operating plan for electrical systems analysis;
developing a 5-year operating plan for Fire Protection Systems Analysis; evaluating the
fire risk NASA-wide; revising RP-1, "Recommended Practice for the Fire Protection of
Essential Electronic Equipment"; participating in the periodic meetings of the Federal
Fire Forum; tracking NASA compliance with the EPA regulations on HALON; tracking
fire regulations at other Federal agencies; monitoring the fire protection systems at the
NASA wind tunnel facilities, and revising the fire protection chapter of the Basic Safety
Manual. Completed the NASA Safety Standard for Fire Protection. Maintained
awareness of issues relating to Fire Protection requirements by participating in the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Annual Meetings, the NASA Fire
Protection Engineers Meetings, the OSHA Electrical Safety Course presented via the
NASA Video Teleconferencing System, etc. Also participated in the meetings of the
NASA Hazardous Substances Internal Coordination Committee.
Developed a new safety standard that was distributed to the NASA Field Installation
Safety Directors under George Rodney's signature (NASA/WS-1740.10, "NASA Safety
Standard for Underwater Facilities and Non-Open Water Operations"). Participated as a
member of the NASA Certification Review Board that inspected the Underwater Test
Facility of McDonnell Douglas Space Station Division for compliance with NASA's
facility safety standards.
Revised NMI 8621.1F, "Mishap Reporting and Investigation" and NMI 8710.2A, "NASA
Safety and Health Programs." Participated in numerous NASA Field Installation
inspection trips and surveys. Developed an NMI on the NASA Safety Awards Program,
a revision to the NASA Safety Standard for Lifting Devices and Equipment (NSS/GO-
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1740.9B),and a revision to the NMI establishingthe requirements for a safety program
for pressure vessels and pressurized systems (NMI 1710.3C). Participated in a
collaborative effort with the OSHA to complete an OSHA approved NASA Alternate
Safety Standard for Suspended Load Crane Operators. Developed a revision to the NMI
on NASA Safety and Health Programs (NMI 8710.A), a revision to the NASA form for
reporting safety and health hazard abatement plans (Form 1584), a revision to the NASA
form for reporting unsafe or unhealthful conditions (NASA Form 1390), and a revision
to the instructions for NASA Form 1584. Developed a proposed NASA Form (and
instructions) for employee reporting of alleged unsafe or unhealthful working conditions.
Monitored OSHA compliance at the NASA Field Installations and at Headquarters and
compiled the annual reports to OSHA. Prepared the Code QS input for NASA's annual
report to OSHA and periodically prepared tables showing NASA injuries/illnesses and
mishap losses for Code QS. Planned and participated in a NASA Lifting Devices and
Equipment Safety Conference and p_rep_ared the minutes. Completed NSS/_GO-1740.9B,
"NASA Safety Standard for I_ifting Devices and Equipment." Compiled periodic change
packages for the documentation on NASA suspended load operations for Code QS to
transmit to OSHA. Prepared a draft document describing the Operational Safety
Functional Management Review Process including checklists for use by the NASA Field
Installations when performing self-assessments. Completed NMI 1740.3D, "NASA Safety
Program for Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems." Compiled a "Headquarters
Operational Safety Management Reference Book" to provide easy reference to elements
of NASA's Operational Safety Program to NASA safety personnel. Distributed the new
OSHA Enforcement Directive, "Inspection Procedures for the Hazardous Waste
Operations and Emergency Response Standard for 29 CFR 1910.120, Paragraph (q)" to
all the NASA Operational Safety Managers. Maintained awareness of issues relating to
OSHA requirements by participating in the OSHA 47th Annual Federal Safety and
Health Conference, etc.
Participated in a total of 10 Operations and Engineering Panel meetings for which Vitro
provided the minutes and maintained the status on Requests for Action. Participated in
a workshop with the Operations and Engineering Panel. Participated in the 8-Foot,
High-Temperature Tunnel delta Integrated Systems Review at LaRC. Participated in
the Director's Oversight Committee meeting on the Unitary Wind Tunnel Modernization
Project at ARC. Prepared an NMI to charter the Operations and Engineering Panel and
coordinated the comments from the Code Q Division Directors and the SRM&QA
Directors at the NASA Field Installations.
Developed a revision to the NMI on the subject of the NASA Emergency Preparedness
Program (NMI 1040.3), a NASA Headquarters Emergency Preparedness Plan, a training
program for all NASA Emergency Preparedness Program coordinators, and checklists for
use during surveys of the NASA Field Installations. Participated in NASA Headquarters
meetings with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and prepared minutes.
Revised NMI 1590.2, "Notification and Alert System for NASA Officials During Nonduty
Hours," to include provisions for ensuring that NASA meets the new emergency
communication requirements mandated by the White House. Developed a draft
Standard Operations Procedures for NASA's contribution to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (Aerial Reconnaissance) and distributed frequent Situation Reports
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to all NASA EmergencyPreparednessCoordinators regarding the 1993Mississippi River
floods for information purposes. Provided an evaluation of the following items:
Numerous requestsfor safety-related
deviations or waivers
The NASA SuspendedLoad
Operation Analysis/Approval
Reports
The OSHA Reform Bill 115 and
related data
The Headquarters Emergency
Evacuation Plan
The NASA mishap reports
KSC's procedure for handling
approval of suspended load
operations
The NASA Field Installation safety
program self-evaluation reports
The NASA Safety Training Center's
new course on Fire Protection
-Fh'ght and Ground Operations: Worked extensively with Code-0S and the NAsA Field
Installations to ensure adequacy of programs for explosives facility safety and explosives
handling procedures throughout NASA. Our dedication and professional skill won a
letter of recognition from the chairman of the NASA Steering Committee of the Liquid
Oxygen/Liquid Hydrogen Explosion Hazards Program in April 1990 "For contributions
to the liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen explosion hazards program" and a second such
letter from Wayne Frazier/Code QS in December 1990 "For excellent explosives safety
support."
Efforts included the development of an NMI on the subject of obtaining shipping permits
for rocket motors, the development of an NMI on the subject of explosive storage facility
siting review and approval procedures, the development of an emergency exemption to
the Department of Transportation to support the shipment of NASA explosive
components, the development of a checklist for explosives storage and handling for use
during NASA Field Installation surveys and audits, the development of strawman
changes to 49 CFR 173, the development of NSS 1740.12, "Safety Standard for
Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics," a revision to NSS 1740.14, "NASA Hydrogen
Safety Handbook," a revision to NSS 1740.13, "NASA Oxygen Safety Handbook,"
research on an "expert system" (developed by ENSCO Corporation for the Joint Army
Navy NASA Air Force (JANNAF) propulsion safety committee) to determine its
applicability to NASA explosive classification systems, the development of a set of
minimum test requirements for use in propellant development and test verification,
participation (as the NASA representative) in the periodic meetings of the JANNAF
explosives working group, participation (as the NASA representative) in the periodic
meetings of the joint logistics chiefs, participation (as the NASA representative) in the
periodic explosive hazard classification meetings of the Department of Defense Explosive
Safety Board (DDESB), participation (as the NASA representative) in the periodic
meetings of the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group (JOCG), participation in a number
of NASA Field Installation surveys and audits, site checks of each ammonium
perchlorate storage facility at the NASA Field Installations, and participation in the
development of a solid rocket motor test plan for support of dual stacking operations in
the Vertical Assembly Building at KSC. Assisted T. Mosikas at the Wallops Flight
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Facility with procedures for storage and transportation of hydrazine for the Pegasus
assembly and integration facility at the Facility. Participated in a Sounding Rocket and
Balloon annual mishap review at the Wallops Flight Facility and a meeting concerning
explosive proof wiring for working and storage facilities at the Facility. Assisted Wayne
Frazier/QS, Jon Mullin/QS, and Code G with the NASA requirement to comply with
the DoD Explosive Safety Manual or OSHA, researching 49 CFR Parts 100 to 177
(October 1991 version) to determine NASA requirements for shipping rocket motors in a
propulsive state. Submitted the NASA Explosive Safety Standards as a Supplemental
Standard to CFR 1910.109 the OSHA Standard on Explosive Safety. Worked the issue
of the housing of non-essential personnel in the KSC Vertical Assembly Building.
Attended a Critical Design Review at LaRC on the Ignition Supply System in connection
with the NASP Concept Demonstration Engine Model in the 8-Foot, High-Temperature
Tunnel. Attended the Critical Design Review for the Liquid Hydrogen Structural Test
Facility at DFRF. Provided an evaluation of th e fo!lo_wing items:
NASA's aerosystems pyrotechnic
devices
NASA's solid propellants operations
The NASA-wide inventory of
explosive components and their
respective hazard classifications by
DoD and DOT
The Operational Safety Program
developed by MFSC for the RSRM
Propellant Safety Verification Test
A paper prepared by Sandia
National Laboratories on the DOE
plan for explosive waste disposal
The "blast wall" requirements for the
mixer/casting bldg at the NASA
Yellow Creek facility
The Large Solid Rocket Motor
Demilitarization Disposal Plan
drawn up by the Joint Ordnance
Commanders Group
Data on an incident at the Morton
International facility in Nevada
NASA's liquid propellants operations
The HEXDAM software program
for siting new explosive storage
facilities
The siting criteria being used by
each NASA Field Installation for
determining placement of explosive
storage facilities
A study concerning development of
hazards classification data on
propellants and explosives
The report by the Nevada
Governor's Safety Committee on the
Pacific Engineering Production
Company mfg site explosion in May
1988
The burn pad requirements for the
NASA Yellow Creek facility
The Chemical Process Safety Report
publication
The NASA Explosive Safety
Orientation Course at JSC
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Safety Library Document and Safety Data Base Maintenance: Worked extensively with
Code QS and the NASA Field Installations to maintain (in a readily accessible system)
the Safety Division's safety database. Our efforts resulted in a letter of appreciation
from Chuck Mertz/QS in July 1989 "For outstanding service."
Efforts included periodic updating of the library, preparation of periodic bibliography
reports, continuous additions to the database, periodic extracts of information for Code
QS personnel both from the Code QS library and the libraries at each of the NASA
Field Installations and at Headquarters, a revision to QS-DOI-91-001, "NASA
Headquarters Mishap Notification Procedures," and two revisions to QS-DOI-91-002,
"Directory of NASA Safety Personnel." Created budget tables for the Code Q Manager
for Assurance Information Technology in preparation for her presentation to Safety
Division Director. In support of the move to the new Headquarters Building, numerous
boxes of records were transferred to the Federal Records Center; stamped _ _ _
CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET on over i_-0classified documents when they were found
to be improperly marked; contacted the NASA HQ Library to determine if they would
retain the Mishap collection; reduced the size of the Technical Report Collection
considerably by retaining only the front matter (i.e., cover, title page, table of contents,
preface, and introduction) for reports that can be obtained from the NASA HQ Library,
NASA Field Installations, or contractors; created a new file plan for each Q Code and
distributed them to the appropriate personnel; pulled reports that had to be declassified
or destroyed; created a new a list of classified materials; and investigated the possibility
of transferring the Mission Safety Evaluation Reports to CASI/RECON, BWI to reduce
the size of the collection and give the Mission Safety Evaluation report even greater
visibility and distribution. Converted the format of a number of documents to permit
revisions using the OSMA Document Management System developed by Vitro. (One
document of note was converted for revision by the Joint Army Navy NASA Air Force
explosive safety group -- AFAL-TR-88-096 (Vols 1 & 2), "Space Propulsion Hazards
Analysis Manual.") Created a compilation of documentation on Aviation Safety and
distributed copies to Bill Comer/QS, Fred Gregory/Q, Tim McCarthy/JT, and the
members of the Intercenter Aviation Operations Panel. Using the Mishap
Reporting/Corrective Action System, generated various safety reports for the Code Q
Manager for Assurance Information Technology. Indexed, labeled, and filed materials in
the Code QS Safety Software Library and created an inventory of materials, including
the software name, version, numbers of copies, license numbers, and application.
Trend Analysis: This subtask was part of the 2000 series task orders for only the last 15
months of the contract. During that period of time, Vitro completed a draft
document,"Qualification by Similarity Guidelines," that establishes uniform criteria for
determining applications of this cost-saving approach to qualification. We also prepared
a paper clarifying the application and definition of functional, hardware, and item
criticality. Completed RP-1290, "NASA Trend Analysis Procedures" and performed an
evaluation of the Space Station Freedom Trend Analysis Guide. Began developing a
functional management review checklist/survey for determining if the NASA Field
Installations are meeting SR&QA technical assessment requirements. The following
investigations were made as part of the Trend Analysis effort:
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The SecondarySealCavity Pressure
Transducer Failure
SpaceShuttle Main Engine pressure
sensorfailures
Window Cavity Conditioning System
(WCCS) checkvalve failures
SpaceShuttle Main Engine open
problem adversetrends
Qualification by similarity
The payload bay floodlight
The misapplication of the hardware
criticality field in the MSFC failure
reporting databases
Reliability and Maintainability: Participated in the January 1, 1993, Reliability and
Maintainability Steering Co rmpi'ttee_me_eting where we b_elin_e_d eight new practices.
Distributed meetings minutes and provided a letter announcing the next meeting to Code
QS for distribution. Hosted and participated in the May 18-20, 1993, Reliability and
Maintainability Steering Committee meeting where we baselined an additional 15 new
practices. Distributed the initial printing of Supplement #2 of the Preferred Practices to
the participating Field Installations along with requested copies of the original document
and first supplement. Completed resolution of action items from the May meeting with
NASA Field Installation members of the Committee. Conducted a meeting of the
Systems Effectiveness Subcommittee on September 9 and 10 at Vitro to finalize the
format of the draft, "Proven Design Techniques for Effective Maintenance Planning."
The format of the document was finalized and presented the last week of September to
the parent Committee. Minutes of the meeting and the update of the draft Strategic
Plan were completed.
Provided course preparation materials to LeRC to support development of the
NASA-wide Reliability Training course currently planned under Code Q funding.
Drafted a summaryposition paper for the NASA/Russian Space Agency panel for
the Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium in January 1994 and
distributed it for review by the Russians and Carl Schneider/QW. All comments
were incorporated and the paper was submitted for publication in the symposium
proceedings. Secured pledges for funding for the Russians' transportation and
lodging and reserved Aeroflot flights for their travel. Prepared a request for their
visas to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Prepared and delivered support packets for
use by Fred Gregory/Q at the symposium panels and the session he chaired.
(ANSER Corporation acted as our interface with the Russians.)
Technical Assessments: This subtask was part of the 2000 series task orders for only the
last 15 months of the contract. One of the assessments performed by Ken Wong
prompted Dr. Greenfield/QT to confer a letter of appreciation in May 1993 "For a
commendable assessment report."
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We revised NMI 8070.xx, "Verification of Space Flight Systems," based on comments
received from reviewers at NASA Field Installations and Headquarters. Consolidated
NASA-wide responses and review comments on the draft MIL-STD-1540C, "Test
Requirements for Booster, Upper Stages, and Space Vehicle." Incorporated comments
to the Lessons Learned Strategic Plan and Implementation Plan made by the NASA
Field Installations. Wrote two chapters in the draft document "Dynamic Test Tailoring
Guidelines." We also performed the following Independent Technical Assessments:
Brake/Skid-Control Servovalve
Jammed Open Failure Mode
Space Shuttle Orbiter Skin Corrosion
The Use of Ammonia as the
Working Fluid in the Space Station--
Freedom Thermal Control System
Dynamic Testing Guidelines and
Tradeoffs
Requirements for Structural Factors
of Safety
Aft Compartment Emergency
Venting System
Impact Damage to the Orbiter
Windows
International Standardization of
Environmental Testing for Space
Programs
Vibroacoustic Testing Guidelines
and Tradeoffs
In addition to the above assessments, we also investigated a number of other anomalies:
Shuttle Freon Coolant Loop Leakage
Problems
Oxidizer Preburner Augmented
Spark Igniter Purge Check Valve
Failure That Resulted in an On-pad
Abort of STS-55
Shuttle Orbiter Structural Corrosion
Shuttle Wing Leading Edge Pinhole
Erosion
Shuttle Orbiter Vertical Tail
Attachment Oversized Bolt-holes
Anomalies of the Pyro-valve Used
on the CLUSTER Test Article by
the European Space Agency
Space Station Freedom Fracture
Control Cost Reduction
Considerations
Systems Safety Training Development: Developed course materials (including instructor
guides, transparencies, and handouts) for four safety courses:
Program Managers Safety Course Middle Managers Safety Course
System Safety Managers Orientation Mishap Investigation Course
Course
The Middle Managers Course was presented to NASA personnel as a pilot course, and
the Program Managers Safety Course continues to be presented as part of the overall
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NASA training program for program managers. The final delivery of the Mishap
Investigation Course training material was a first draft.
Another significant contribution made by Vitro under this subtask was the development
of the concept for a computer-based system to facilitate maintenance of an up-to-date
Safety Training Catalog. (The development of the actual software tool for achieving this
end was reported as part of the NASA Safety Information System subtask.)
Safety Documentation Development and Update: The primary effort during this contract
has been the updating of the Basic Safety Manual, now to be known as NHB 1700.1 (V1-
B), "NASA Safety Policy and Requirements Document." As such, the manual was
coordinated through a number of cycles of revision and distribution to the NASA Field
Installations for review and comment. Our efforts in maintaining steady progress toward
its completion inspired Wayne Frazier/QS to confer a letter of appreciation in_April
-1991 "For outstandifig support in documentation and training." -
Another significant contribution made by Vitro under this subtask was the development
of the concept for a computer-based system to facilitate incorporation of comments
during the development or update of any NASA safety document. (The development of
the actual software tool for achieving this end was reported as part of the NASA Safety
Information System subtask.)
Under this subtask, Vitro also performed final production on 29 "first-time-ever" safety
NMIs, handbooks, and standards that were developed as part of the technical efforts
already noted in earlier paragraphs of this report:
NASA Safety Standard
NSS/SY1740.X, "Payload and Cargo
Element Safety Requirements"
The final report of the Ad Hoe
Committee, 'The Status Report of
the STS Safety Risk Assessment of
the Ad Hoc Committee," dated July
1988
A Hazard Analysis Methodology
Report for Space Station Freedom
A first draft of SSP 30315, "Space
Station Users Requirements
Document"
Proposed NHB 1700.7C, "Safety
Policy and Requirements for
Payloads" (for Space Station
Freedom)
A Range Safety Plan
NSS 1740.11, "NASA Safety Standard
for Fire Protection"
A Database Requirements Report
for Space Station Freedom
A first draft of SSP 30309, "Safety
Analysis and Risk Assessment
Requirements" (for Space Station
Freedom)
NMI 1700.8, "Space Debris
Limitations"
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An NMI on the subject of the useof
radioactive materials in space
A draft set of NASA specific
software safety objectives
A draft NASA SoftwareSafety
Standard
Draft NMI 8070.xx,"BasicPolicy and
Proceduresfor Human Engineering"
A NASA Safety Standard,"Human
Engineering Guidelines for Safety
Assurance"
NASA SafetyStandard NASA/WS-
1740.10,"NASA SafetyStandard for
Underwater Facilities and Non-Open
Water Operations"
An alternative OSHA Safety
Standard for KSC cranes
An NMI on the subject of explosive
storage facility siting review and
approval procedures
An NMI on the subject of aviation
safety
A draft document, "Qualification by
Similarity Guidelines"
A draft methodology for application
of software safety analysis techniques
to NASA software development
projects
A draft NASA Software Safety
Requirements Document
A Human Engineering/Safety
Analysis Methodology
Preliminary NHB 1700.1, Vol. 6,
"Human Engineering Handbook for
Safety Assurance"
The Safety 2000 Document-
The NASA Headquarters Emergency
Preparedness Plan
An NMI on the subject of obtaining
shipping permits for rocket motors
NSS 1740.12, "Safety Standard for
Explosives, Propellants, and
Pyrotechnics"
An aviation safety officers guidebook
This subtask also provided for the final production on Vitro-developed revisions to 17
other safety NMIs, handbooks, and standards that were made as part of the technical
efforts already noted in earlier paragraphs of this report:
An NHB for Aerosystems Safety
NSTS 22254, "Methodology for
Conduct of NSTS Hazard Analysis"
NMI 8710.2A, "NASA Safety and
Health Programs"
NMI 1710.3C, "Safety Program for
Pressure Vessels and Pressurized
Systems"
An NHB for Facilities Safety
NMI 8621.1F, "Mishap Reporting
and Investigation"
NMI 1040.3, "NASA Emergency
Preparedness Program"
NASA Safety Standard NSS/GO-
1740.9B, "NASA Safety Standard for
Lifting Devices and Equipment"
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RP-1, "Recommended Practice for
the Fire Protection of Essential
Electronic Equipment"
Volume 9 of NHB 1700.1, "Fire
Protection"
NSS 1740.13, "NASA Oxygen Safety
Handbook"
NMI 8070.4A, "Risk Management
Policy for Manned Flight Programs"
NMI 8070.xx, "Verification of Space
Flight Systems"
SUBCONTRACTS AND CONSULTANTS
QS-DOI-91-001, "NASA
Headquarters Mishap Notification
Procedures"
QS-DOI-91-002, "Directory of NASA
Safety Personnel"
NSS 1740.14, "NASA Hydrogen
Safety Handbook"
RP- 1290, "NASA Trend Analysis
Procedures" (was NHB 8070.5)
Vitro successfully elicited assistance from 11 subcontractors in the specialized safety area
during the course of the Vitro contract to meet emerging NASA and OSMA
requirements:
Planning Research Corporation (PRC)
Through a series of subcontracts with PRC, Vitro acquired for Code QS assistance in the
Code Q independent risk assessment for the Galileo mission, an update for PRC's
computerized fault tree for potential Space Shuttle accidents, an integrated risk
assessment software package for estimating the accident risks for the Ulysses mission,
and a reliability estimate for the TITAN IV launch vehicle.
BDM International, Inc. (BDM)
Through a single subcontract with BDM, Vitro acquired for Code Q a conference paper
on the Space Station risks associated with space debris, an associated bibliography, and a
speech on the same subject for George Rodney.
Lloyd Philipson
Through a series of consulting agreements with Lloyd Philipson, Vitro acquired for Code
QS assistance in the Code Q independent risk assessment for the Ulysses mission,
refinements in the Space Shuttle accident probability model, and an evaluation of an Air
Force Range Safety Analysis.
Pickard, Lowe, and Garrick
Through a series of subcontracts with Pickard, Lowe, and Garrick, Vitro acquired for
Code QS an evaluation of a report on the Space Shuttle orbiter thermal protection
system, 'q'he Probabilistic Risk Analysis Model and Preliminary Observations." We also
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acquired an evaluation of hazard assessmentechniques currently used in the Space
Shuttle program asopposed to emerging technologiesfor quantitative risk assessment.
The final report was delivered on November 7, 1988,"Enhanced Hazard Analysis for
SpaceSystems."
The University of Virginia
Through a series of subcontracts with the Center for Risk Management of Engineering
Systems at The University of Virginia, Vitro acquired access to two new risk assessment
technologies for Code QS -- the Partitioned Multiobjective Risk Method for Extreme
Value Events and the Evaluation of Identification and Ranking Methods for FMEA/CIL
Items.
Safety Factor Associates (SFA)
Through a series of consulting agreements with SFA, Vitro acquired for Code QS
enhancements in the Space Shuttle accident probability model, major contributions to
the joint Code Q/M reliability model for the Space Shuttle, assistance in the Code Q
evaluation of the MSFC Assured Shuttle Availability model, several workshops for
NASA personnel to become proficient in the new techniques for probabilistic risk
assessment, assistance in the development of the appropriate failure estimates by the
Failure Probability Splinter Group for use in the TITAN IV launch vehicle Databook for
the Cassini Mission, an "Uncertainty Analysis" that was the basic source for the error
bars placed on the final results of the nuclear safety evaluation performed by the
Interageney Nuclear Safety Review Panel in their report to the White House on the
radiological risks of the Ulysses mission, assistance in the Code Q independent risk
assessments for both the Galileo and Ulysses missions, two Bayesian analysis software
modules for use in Probabilistic Risk Assessment, assistance in an integrated risk
assessment of the Micro-rover for the Mars Environmental Survey mission, assistance to
the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator Working Group, assistance to the
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel for the Cassini mission, and a calculational
model for the Space Station assembly integrated risk assessment. Provided a report
entitled "Model for Uncertainty Analysis of Frequency of Failure to Attain HTC for
Space Station Transition Options A-1 and A-2." Also provided a diskette with the model
described above. (The Space Station option assessment was performed in conjunction
with SAIC, Bob Weinstock/Vitro, and two members of Code QS -- Pete Rutledge and
Ben Buchbinder.)
Technical Analysis, Inc. (TAI)
Through two separate subcontracts with TAI, Vitro acquired for Code QS an Ordnance
Siting and Certification Plan and the expert services of Jim Wiggins, who participated as
a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on its 1988 evaluation of the Space Shuttle risk
management system. The Ad Hoc Committee developed a final report, "The Status
Report of the STS Safety Risk Assessment of the Ad Hoc Committee," dated July 1988.
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Operations Research, Inc. (ORI)
Through a single subcontract with ORI, Vitro acquired for Code Q the expert services of
Joyce McDevitt, who participated as a member of the Ad Hoc Committee for its 1988
evaluation of the Space Shuttle risk management system. The Committee developed a
final report, 'q'he Status Report of the STS Safety Risk Assessment of the Ad Hoc
Committee," dated July 1988.
Louis J. Polaski
Through a single consulting agreement with Mr. Polaski, Vitro acquired for Code Q the
expert services of Louis J. Polaski, who participated as a member of the Ad Hoc
Committee for its 1988 evaluation of the Space Shuttle risk management system. The
Committee developed a final report, "The Status Report of the _STS Safety Risk
-Assessment of the Ad Hoc Committee," dated July 1988.
Symbiotic Technologies, Inc. (STI)
Through a single subcontract with STI, Vitro acquired for Code Q a survey of
probabilistic design methods and the initiation of an evaluation of the commercially
available PROBAN software program and NESIS, a software program developed on a
LeRC contract. Both software programs are for use in performing probabilistic
structural analysis.
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Through a single subcontract with SAIC, Vitro acquired for Code Q a series of seminars
on risk assessment and risk management (along with tutorial materials). Seminars were
given at NASA Headquarters, at JSC, and at LeRC. We also acquired an evaluation of
three candidate launch vehicle architectures proposed by MSFC for the advanced space
transportation development program -- a "Shuttle forever" architecture, an integrated
cargo transfer return vehicle/personnel launch system architecture relying on an
expendable launch vehicle with 50,000-pound launch capacity to low Earth orbit using
Saturn F1A and J2 engines, and a medium cargo transfer return vehicle architecture in
which a 90,000-pound-capacity vehicle is derived from the 50,000-pound core.
We also acquired a PC-based Excel" software module for generation and analysis of
event trees and consequence trees (part of the prototype Space Systems Reliability Data
workstation NASA acquired under another SAIC subcontract through the Air Force).
Under the Vitro subcontract with SAIC, we procured several demonstrations and trial
uses of the entire workstation for NASA Headquarters managers and Vitro personnel.
We also procured a User's Guide for the entire Workstation.
Participated in a top-level assessment of the two most viable options for the proposed
Space Station redesign to ascertain the relative programmatic risks. (The Space Station
option assessment was performed in conjunction with Mike Frank/SFA, Bob
Weinstock/Vitro, and two members of Code QS -- Pete Rutledge and Ben Buchbinder.
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IlL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Vitro Safety team has grown to understand the variety of difficulties that hinder the
Code QS efforts to bring real improvements to NASA Safety Programs. Our efforts over
the past 6 years have been devoted to improving the ability of the program managers to
make informed decisions regarding safety and to improve the handbooks and manuals
used throughout NASA on a daily basis. The following recommendations were derived
from our comprehensive analysis of NASA safety programs:
During our many visits to the NASA Field Installations on safety surveys and audits,
it became clear that one Field Installation (LaRC) enjoyed far better support for
the safety programs from the "Program" side of the house. We suspect the
excellence of LaRC's safety program is due to a single difference in their
management approach. The SRM&QA Director at LaRC has a 20-% input to the
annual performance appraisal for each of the other department heads.
OSMA may wish to have the NASA SRM&QA community consider allowing each
of the SRM&QA Directors a 20% input to the annual performance appraisals for
their respective department heads. Additionally, Code Q may wish to suggest a
similar Code Q input into SRM&QA Directors evaluations.
One of the most significant contributions Vitro made to the Safety and Risk
Management effort was to advance our expertise in software safety. A great deal
has been accomplished to introduce the new idea within the NASA Programs that
software has become intensively involved in systems designs and can no longer be
treated in the old, familiar manner. However, perhaps it is time to step-up the
program. NASA should consider seeking out an experienced software safety person
to add to the Code QS staff. NASA Code QS could also benefit from the
experience of an on-staff Fire Protection expert.
In the 6 years of this contract, we have witnessed wide fluctuations in Code QS's
travel budget. The reduced number of trips to the NASA Field Installations in the
lean years severely hampered Code QS's ability to perform its function. A great
deal of interaction is really needed, if we are to understand the problems faced by
the safety personnel in the field. Consider giving the travel budget higher priority
in the future.
Safety is most effective in the years before CDR. This holds true for the Space
Station as well. We cannot help feeling that insufficient attention is being given to
that effort, and soon it will be too expensive to correct any safety problems in the
design. Consider applying a larger portion of the Code QS (or Code Q) effort to
the oversight of the Space Station safety program.
Our Explosive Safety expert is already on record regarding the blast wall that is in
the plans for the mixer/casting building at the Yellow Creek Facility in Iuka, MS.
Although funding has been temporarily eliminate that facility, the blast wall remains
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in the design. Our expert feels the $3 million could better be spent elsewhere
because OSHA does not require such a wall and because there is no real evidence
that the wall could protect the workers on the "safe" side.
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3000 SERIES TASK ORDER
PAYLOADS AND AERONAUTICS
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
In the beginning of the contract, three task areas (systems assessment, trend analysis, and
data systems) were formed to assess and communicate to top NASA management safety,
reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA) problems that could impact
mission success. Because these three functions are synergistic activities requiring a
coordinated effort, the Systems Assessment and Trend Analysis Division (Code QT) was
formed in 1990 to consolidate these efforts. Vitro support to the new Code QT was
provided under the 3000 series task order. Prior to 1990, the Data Systems/Trend
Analysis and Systems Assessment were two separate divisions where Vitro support was
provided gilder 3000 and 4000 series tasl_-0rders, respectively.
In support of Code QT, the Vitro tasks encompassed the following:
Data Systems: Evaluate, develop, and implement NASA SRM&QA data
base/information management systems. Manage, operate, and maintain a
headquarters-level SRM&QA management information center (MIC). Provide data
systems support for the Space Shuttle prelaunch assessment review (PAR) process.
Operate and utilize problem reporting and corrective action systems to write
queries/extract data to support engineers conducting trend analyses and technical
assessments.
Trend Analysis: Develop, implement, and assess NASA trend analysis programs at
Headquarters, Field Installations, and contractor sites. Develop, revise, and update
documentation (management instructions, handbooks, standards) for use as
Agencywide guidelines and procedures for performing trend analysis. Perform
trend/correlation analyses to identify adverse trends and anticipate potential
problems.
Systems Assessment: Conduct independent technical engineering assessments at the
system, program, and element level. Provide an independent "second look" at
engineering issues/concerns in the SRM&QA areas for Code Q. Participate in and
provide technical backup for design reviews, flight readiness reviews, and test
readiness reviews. Prepare an assessment report that includes problem description,
information collected, analysis results, conclusions, and recommendations for
resolution of problem areas.
In December 1992, a Code Q reorganization resulted in a reassignment and revision of
task orders. The systems assessment, data systems, and trend analysis functions were
transferred to the Safety and Risk Management Division (Code QS) under the 2000
series task order. Code QT was renamed as the "Quality Management (Payloads)
Division." This new organization was established as a direct interface with the Payload
Program Offices for all OSMA functions. With an Agencywide goal of conducting all
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missions "better, faster, cheaper," the new Division was created to ensure that limited
SRM&QA resources were utilized more effectively throughout the life cycle of a payload
development program. Particular emphasis was directed towards a more active
involvement of Code Q in the early phases of the program.
In January 1994, Code QT was again renamed/changed to the "Payloads and Aeronautics
Division." The roles and responsibilities of this new division have not yet been fully
defined, but will encompass SRM&QA activities for both Expendable Launch Vehicle
(ELV) and Aeronautics programs in addition to the continuing support for NASA
Payload programs.
II. SUMMARY OF TASK ACTIVITY
DATA SYSTEMS/TRI_ND ANALYSIS/SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT
Data Systems
Vitro increased the use of information technology in support of Code Q meetings. Vitro
was heavily involved in the design of a system to improve the overall effectiveness of the
PAR process through expanded use of automation. Vitro evaluated numerous software
and hardware packages for potential use in automating the PAR process. PAR
automation tools using NeXT workstations, various software packages, and peripherals
were integrated by Vitro. Vitro coordinated the installation of equipment for still-image
capture and transmission and installation of the BARCO projection television in the
Code Q Management Information Center (QMIC) to support meetings and
presentations.
Vitro staff were extremely responsive in writing queries to extract data from the Program
Compliance Assurance and Status System (PCASS)/Problem Reporting and Corrective
Action (PRACA) systems to support technical assessments being conducted by both
NASA and Vitro engineers. The Vitro data systems staff, as experts in PCASS/PRACA
operation and utilization, provided training to numerous Code Q, Code M, and Vitro
engineers. Vitro identified data integrity problems (e.g., missing, incomplete, or
incorrect codes/data) within the PCASS/PRACA data bases. Subsequently, a major
effort was undertaken by the NASA Field Installations to improve data accuracy and
completeness within their PCASS/PRACA data bases.
Vitro maintained, managed, and operated a SRM&QA QMIC to display correlated
technical and management data to identify trends and potential programmatic impacts.
For each launch, a briefing book executive summary containing QMIC charts was
prepared for the Code Q Associate Administrator. Vitro assisted in the development
and implementation of a significant problem reporting system to track/monitor
significant problems and bring them to the immediate attention of top NASA
management. This system was helpful in tracking the status and disposition of several
hundred significant problems that had to be resolved prior to the Space Shuttle return to
flight.
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Trend Analysis
Vitro assisted NASA in developing and updating the following trend analysis
documentation:
NMI 8070.3, "Problem Reporting, Corrective Action, And Trend Analysis
Requirements" (establishes the NASA policy and requirements for the conduct and
reporting of trend analysis).
NASA Reference Publication (RP-1290), "NASA Trend Analysis Procedures"
(provides uniform guidelines for implementing and conducting trend analyses for
aeronautics and space programs).
NASA-STD-8070.5, "Trend Analysis Techniques" (describ_e_s mathem_atical/statistical
techniques).
In addition, Vitro authored a Space Station Trend Analysis Guide. This document
identifies trend analysis documents, activities, projects, and resources that are available
and applicable to the Space Station. This guide was distributed to the NASA Field
Installations for review and received favorable comments.
Vitro played a key role in the inception and development of the NASA Trend Analysis
Working Group (TAWG), which provided a forum or mechanism for developing and
disseminating state-of-the-art trend analysis knowledge, tools (statistical software), and
techniques. Vitro prepared trend analysis presentations, meeting minutes, and agendas
and reviewed trend analysis proposals, projects, and activities. Support for the TAWG
meetings resulted in a significant increase in trend analysis projects and activities.
Vitro conducted many trend analyses to assess or identify recurring problems. For
example, Vitro assessments concerning failure trends and state-of-the-art technology for
spacecraft data recorders, gyros, and deployable mechanisms/structures were prepared
and commended by upper Code Q management.
Technical Assessments
Vitro assessed numerous technical and critical issues associated with the Orbiter, Solid
Rocket Motor, Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Space Shuttle Main Engine and External
Tank, Space Station, payloads, and specific engineering issues (e.g., spacecraft testing).
(Note: Vitro completed more than 180 technical assessments. At the end of each fiscal
year, selected assessments were bound and provided to Code QT for future reference
and archival purposes.) Technical Interchange Meetings were held periodically in which
Vitro personnel provided briefings of interim and final results of current technical
assessments to upper NASA management including the Code Q Associate Administrator.
Several letters of commendation were received by Vitro personnel for outstanding
performance or accomplishment of urgent and critical assessments. Two Vitro
employees who supported Code QT were honored with the prestigious Manned Flight
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Awareness(MFA) award. Vitro engineers were also selected for monitoring and
participating in special investigation teams and technical committees that included the
following: Task Force 10 for Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
(GOES), Galileo High Gain Antenna (HGA), Advanced Technology Satellite (ACTS)
Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS), HST Gyro Failure Review Board, and Space Station
Electrical Grounding Tiger Team.
Many of the technical assessments received high visibility or contributed to the decision-
making process. For example, during the STS-37 prelaunch assessment of the cracks in
the hinge of the ET doors, a Vitro stress analysis indicated negative margins of safety.
This analysis/assessment, which addressed launch mission risk, provided Code Q
management rationale for delaying the launch until the problem was corrected. Other
critical Shuttle-related topics assessed by Vitro included software, instrumentation
(transducer crack), and SRB aft skirt factor of safety issues.
Vitro evaluated and analyzed the Shuttle avionics systems (software/hardware) issues
and performed independent assessments of problems and recommended corrective
actions. In support of Space Shuttle flight readiness reviews, Vitro provided Code Q
with a software readiness package/assessment prior to each launch. These assessments
provided Code Q with rationale for accepting the Certification of Flight Readiness.
Furthermore, Vitro maintained and updated a flight software manifest related to the
Shuttle flight schedule and significant software changes.
Highly complex and technical Space Station issues were identified by Vitro and brought
to the attention of the Space Station Deputy Director. Vitro identified and assessed
critical Electrical Power System (EPS) stability and plasma contactor issues and
concerns. Vitro identified the need for fully reviewing the EPS design and the need for
IV&V analysis and enhanced systems testing. Vitro worked with Level II (LeRC) in
developing an EPS secondary stability change request (CR) that would develop criteria
to ensure system-level stability. EPS stability issues raised were instrumental in the
formation of an Engineering Design Council tiger team. In addition, a Vitro assessment
(Low Earth Orbit Plasma/Space Station Electrical Power System) led to a series of
investigations that resulted in the procurement/development of a plasma contactor.
QUALITY MANAGEMENT (PAYLOADS)
Vitro conducted a study on vibroacoustic testing risks and tradeoffs. A technical paper
was prepared based on this study and was presented at the Spacecraft Launch Vehicle
Dynamics Environments Technical Interchange Meeting as well as at the ESA/ESTEC
Environmental Testing for Space Programs Symposium. Vitro is preparing a dynamic
test tailoring guidelines document as a follow-on to the vibroacoustic study. Vitro
personnel are members of special aerospace advisory panels for professional
organizations such as the Aerospace Testing Seminar Advisory Panel.
Vitro conducted an assessment that surveyed and evaluated NASA, U.S. Air Force/DoD,
and aerospace industry guidelines and practices on the use of qualification by similarity
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to reduce testing of spaceflight hardware. Becausethe assessmentidentified differences
in content and level of detail guiding useof qualification by similarity among these
organizations,Vitro developedand proposeduniform NASA-wide guidelines on
qualification by similarity.
As part of NASA's goal of reducing the cost of scientific space missions, Code QT
conducted a workshop aimed at reducing the cost of quality. Personnel from each Field
Installation, major NASA contractors, NASA Headquarters, and academia participated
in this 3-day workshop at the University of Maryland. Vitro was an active participant in
the development and coordination of this highly successful workshop. The success of this
initial effort has led to a continuing initiative at each of the payload Field Installations.
Vitro assisted in revising NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 8010.1, "Classification of
NASA Payloads." The intent of the revision was to provide payload developers increased
flexibility _ri determining how best to m/tx-imize existing SRM&QA resources while still
maintaining an acceptable level of risk. The revised NMI is still in draft form, but will
continue to be a necessary component in implementing an effective payload SRM&QA
program.
In response to a request by the Code S Program Office, Vitro assisted Code QT in
evaluating the impact to the overall reliability of the Earth Observing System if EEE
parts requirements were reduced. Vitro provided the results of this assessment to the
Program Office and assisted them in the decision-making process.
At the request of the Submillimeter Wave Astronomy Satellite (SWAS) Program
Manager, Vitro assisted Code QT in conducting a reaction wheel study. The purpose of
the study was to evaluate a Project decision to change the proposed design and to
eliminate spare components. The results of the study presented to the Program Manager
indicated the Project was proceeding in an appropriate manner.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Vitro has been very responsive in meeting the changing requirements of Code QT over
the life of the contract. Despite numerous reorganizations, downsizing, and restructuring
of tasks, Vitro has effectively realigned its staff to provide the right skill mix to meet the
needs of Code QT. Vitro has contributed significantly to the areas of data systems, trend
analysis, and systems assessment. The data integrity of the PCASS/PRACA systems has
improved significantly. This has facilitated and enabled performance of more accurate
trending. The development of NASA trend analysis documentation and establishment of
the TAWG has significantly increased trend analysis activities and projects throughout
NASA. Many Space Shuttle, Space Station, and payload-related systems/technical
assessments prepared by Vitro received high visibility and have contributed to the
SRM&QA decision-making process.
The efforts of Code QT and Vitro have gained increased visibility in the Program Offices
under the new Quality Management (Payloads) Division. This new visibility has allowed
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the Code QT/Vitro team to become a value-added contributor to the development of
NASA payload programs.
The new direction the Payloads and Aeronautics Division is taking must ensure OSMA
continues to increase its involvement in the early phases of the Payload Development
programs. This increased visibility and participation in the early decision-making process
will be required if NASA is to maintain an acceptable level of risk with increasingly
limited resources. The OSMA should be actively involved in payload program activities
throughout the duration of the program (from early development through integration and
launch). Also, Code QT needs to maintain the SRM&QA function as an aggressive
contributing element in the planning, development, and implementation of the Payload,
ELV, Upper Stages, and Aeronautics programs. NASA should maintain a process that
clearly defines, evaluates, and articulates the impact of program decisions on mission risk
throughout program life cycles. This process should include oversight, independent
/_sessment, performance of contract (RFP and SOW) reviews, and active participation as
members of Program Design Review Boards, Change Boards, System Effectiveness
Review Boards, Flight Readiness Review Boards, and Launch Management Teams.
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4000 SERIES TASK ORDER
ENGINEERING
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
OSMA develops and advances Agencywide engineering standards and practices that form
the backbone of NASA's safety and mission assurance capability. OSMA's programs in
software engineering and assurance, applied technology, systems engineering, and metric
transition contribute directly to engineering standards. OSMA also assesses flight
readiness of Shuttle software. OSMA's systems engineering and metric transition efforts
are integrated with national initiatives (involving other government agencies) to improve
the competitiveness of U.S. industry in international markets.
-This task began in J'ati-uary 1991, shortly after the Technical Standards I)ivision's
organization, and included efforts in engineering standards, metric transition, and
advanced technologies. Task 1000 previously incorporated the engineering standards and
metric transition activities. In 1993, the scope of the task order expanded to include
software engineering and assurance, electronic part packaging, and EEE parts, when
these technical areas became responsibilities of the newly named Engineering Division.
Earlier these activities were supported by Tasks 1000 and 3000.
II. SUMMARY OF TASK ACTIVITY
For all engineering programs, Vitro's proactive engineers developed sensible plans and
independently reviewed work done by the Field Installations and outside organizations.
We developed new OSMA procedures for expediting the preparation of technical
documents. We assisted with the organization of and participated in high-level NASA
steering committees and workshops. Vitro's staff met with the OSMA staff to plan
activities and worked as a team to provide responsive, timely, and consistent support.
Our accomplishments were documented in Monthly Technical Progress Reports, informal
monthly highlighted briefings, and specific technical reports.
TECHNICAL STANDARDS
To improve OSMA's processes for developing, revising, adopting, and tailoring standards,
Vitro helped Code QW develop the NASA Standardization Procedures Handbook (NHB
8070.XX). The new development process is superior to current approaches because:
The Agencywide NMI/NHB process is more difficult and time-consuming and is not
specifically designed for standards.
* The more direct Field Installation processes do not yield uniform standards.
While NHB 8070.XX is not yet ready for the final approval and concurrence process, we
used it on a trial basis for some software-related documents.
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METRIC TRANSITION
Public Law 100-418 and Executive Order 12770 require all Federal agencies to adopt the
metric system of measurement. Compliance is important because this national initiative
brings higher productivity and international competitiveness to U.S. industry. OSMA
leads an Agencywide metrication effort and maintains high-visibility contacts with the
Congress, the Department of Commerce, and other Federal agencies. OSMA, with help
from Vitro, established the NASA Metrication Planning Group (NMPG) at
Headquarters to plan the Agency's metric transition and coordinate its implementation.
Using Vitro's sound advice, OSMA modified NASA's metric use policy, prepared a
metric transition plan, and compiled annual reports to the Congress.
The Administrator approved NMI 8010.2A, "Use of the Metric System of Measurement
in NASA Programs," in June 1991 and N_A_SA's Metric Transition Plan inclu_ding_a Metric
Waiver Process in February 1992. The policy made OSMA responsible for "establishing
procedures to implement this policy"; the plan assigned three activities to OSMA: overall
leadership of NASA transition activities, administering the plan's waiver process, and
identifying requirements for metric standards. The NMI was an update of the earlier
policy that incorporated changes required to comply with Public Law 100-418 and
Executive Order 12770. Vitro reviewed plans and reports prepared by individual
program offices and Field Installations, looking for sound engineering practices and
consistency among programs, Field Installations, and Federal agencies, and identified
items for OSMA that required clarification or improvement. When OSMA received a
waiver request, we evaluated it using the same criteria and suggested activities to OSMA
that the development program could perform to expedite NASA's metric transition.
Vitro assisted OSMA with preparation of the annual metrication report to the Congress.
This report, submitted to the Congress in January, covers progress in the past year and
outlines activities planned for the current year. In addition, we helped OSMA prepare a
June 1992 metrication status report to the Department of Commerce. In drafting these
reports we used our knowledge gained from familiarity with NASA's transition plan,
participation at meetings, and contacts with the NMPG. Our efforts for OSMA have
contributed to good relations with the Congress, the GAO, and the metric program office
at NIST.
Vitro supported and documented meetings of the NMPG that are scheduled on an as-
needed basis. We also assisted OSMA with about one meeting per year for the Field
Installation coordinators, and teleconferences as needed.
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
OSMA manages applied technology programs for aerospace batteries and pyrotechnically
assisted systems. These programs require preparation of program plans, handbooks, and
other documents, development of databases, and general technical and administrative
support for meetings and workshops. Vitro worked with the managers of applied
technology programs to plan meetings and other support activities. Our staff helped
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OSMA develop, review, and revise key documents. We also provided advice to the
NASA program managersto ensurethat NASA pursuesrelevant development activities.
For the pyrotechnically assistedsystems(PAS) program, Vitro assistedthe OSMA
program managerwith the development of both a program plan and a program
implementation plan. Vitro participated in PAS Steering Committee meetingsand
prepared minutes of thesemeetings. Vitro also participated in meetingsof the
aerospacebattery program SteeringCommittee and undertook the task of publishing the
proceedingsof the 1987and 1988NASA Battery SystemsWorkshops.
soFrWARE ENGINEERING AND ASSURANCE
Avionics System Software
For each Shuttle flight, Vitro prepared a Shuttle Software Assessment in Support of the
Flight Readiness Review (FRR). This effort evaluated software changes, discrepancies,
and late flight software patches. The reports contained detailed descriptions for the
Shuttle Avionics, Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME), and Ground-Launched System
Software in support of the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) and the Safety and Mission
Assurance Certification of Flight Readiness.
During the development of new Operational Increment (OI) flight software, Vitro
reviewed software changes and discrepancies in all program phases, including initial
requirements, development, embedded verification and validation, and final operation,
and prepared technical assessments. For example, in November 1992, Vitro provided a
status report and analysis of the major software Change Requests during baseline,
development and mission preparation phases of the O1-22 flight software that was
scheduled to fly with STS-57 in April 1993. Vitro maintained and updated OSMA's
flight software manifest relating the Shuttle flight schedule to significant software
changes; this chart was delivered to Codes Q and M for monthly program reviews.
Vitro also evaluated and analyzed software and hardware issues for the Shuttle avionics
systems, performed independent assessments of problems, and recommended corrective
action to OSMA. For instance, Vitro provided assessments of=software development and
independent verification and validation requirements during the PDR and CDR reviews
for the new Day-Of-Launch I-Load Update Version II (DOLILU II) Processor. In
addition, we reviewed and analyzed the development of Multifunction Display Electronic
System (MEDS) software and hardware during the PDR and informed OSMA of issues
and concerns, and reviewed and assessed the implementation of the Global Positioning
System (GPS) project for the orbiter.
Deliverables:
"Shuttle Software Assessment," separate reports for each STS flight (49, 50, 46, 47, 52,
53, 54, 56, and 55) manifested with the Operational Increment (O1-21) flight software.
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"Shuttle Software Assessment,"separatereports for each STS flight (57, 51, 58, 61, and
60) manifestedwith the Operational Increment (O1-22) flight software.
"Software Defect Analysis Assessment,"VC-OSC-T-017(92),dated April 24, 1992.
"Software ChangeRequest Implementation ProcessFailure Assessment,"VC-OSC-T-
018(92),dated May 29, 1992.
"STS-49On-Orbit Flight SoftwareAnomalies Report," VC-OSC-T-020(92), dated May
29, 1992.
"DOLILU II Preliminary Design Review (PDR) Status,"VC-OSC-T-021(92), dated June
19, 1992.
-"Autoland Detailed T_st Objective (DTO)-Status," VC-OSC-T-026(92), dated,_,ugust31,
1992.
"Autoland Detailed Test (DTO) Status,"VC-OSC-T-029(92), dated September22, 1992.
"STS-52Late Flight SoftwareK-Load Patch," VC-OSC-T-033(92),dated October 16,
1992.
"STS-52Late Flight SoftwarePatch StatusReport," VC-OSC-T-033(92), dated October
16, 1992.
'Technical Assessment, Flight Software Operational Increment (O1-22) Status Report,"
VC-OSC-T-036(92), dated November 23, 1992.
"Assessment of AP-101S General Purpose Computer (GPC)," VC-OSC-T-070(92), dated
January 2, 1993.
"DOLILU II Critical Design Review (CDR) Status," VC-OSA-T-008(93), dated February
22, 1993.
"DOLILU II Delta Critical Design Review (CDR) Status," VC-OSA-T-028(93), dated
August 2, 1993.
"GPS Software Implementation Status Follow-up," VC-OSA-T-001 (94), dated January 6,
1994.
"DOLILU II System IV&V Implementation," Report, dated March 19, 1992.
"RMS Fault-Detection Error Annunciations," Report, dated May 11, 1992.
"STS-49 Orbit Rendezvous Fault Message Annunciation," Report, dated May 14, 1992.
"SASCB Discussion, Orbit Targeting Implementation," Report, dated July 13, 1992.
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"PASS and BFS DRs (108538 and 108539) Possible Main Engine Bell Collision," Report,
dated October 6, 1992.
"KCR Tracking and New Implementation Procedure," Report, dated November 6, 1992.
"SAIL Integration Avionics Verification for the O1-22 FSW," Report, dated April 19,
1993.
"STS-57 FSW Patch Threats," Report, dated March 11, 1993.
"STS-71 Spacelab - MIR Mission Docking," Report, dated May 17, 1993.
"Engineering Directorate FSW Process Review for OI-22 baselined (CR 90243C),"
Report, dated June 8, 1993.
"Implementation of Shuttle GPS Software," Report, dated June 8, 1993.
"Assessment of a Change Request (CR) for Major Flight Software Enhancements to OI-
23, 24, 25, and 26," Report to Codes Q and M dated July 19, 1993.
"BFS NO-GO and Suspect Changes," Report, dated August 20, 1993.
"DR 108676 BFS Unable to Transmit on Flight Critical Buses While Engaged," Report,
dated October 21, 1993.
"CR 90476A - Wraparound Yaw Jet System W/Program Test Input (PTI) Effector,"
Report, dated November 16, 1993.
"Presentation on Overall Review of the MEDS Project to OSMA," Presentation, dated
November 18, 1993.
"STS-58 BFS Payload TMBU Processing Error," Report, dated November 23, 1993.
Software Assurance
During the entire contract period, Vitro provided comprehensive support for the initial
Software Engineering Program and the Software Assurance Program plans. An early
effort assisted NASA in preparing, coordinating, and publishing NMI 2410.i0, the basic
NASA policy for software management, assurance, and engineering. Various Software
Management and Assurance Program (SMAP) conferences, meetings, teleconferences,
and videoconferences were supported. Software engineering expertise and experience
was provided for developing, coordinating, editing, publishing, and disseminating software
engineering and assurance documentation, including:
NASA Software Acquisition Life-Cycle
NASA-STD-2100-91, NASA Software Documentation Standard
NASA-STD-2201-93, Software Assurance Standard
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SMAP-GB-A201, Software Assurance Guidebook
NASA-STD-2202-93, Software Formal Inspections Standard
NASA-GB-A302, Software Formal Inspections Guidebook
SMAP-GB-A301, Software Quality Assurance Audits Guidebook.
Technical reports were prepared, as required, such as the Software Configuration
Management Standard Study, October 1993. A recent emphasis was the identification
and evaluation of voluntary industry standards, standards from other Federal agencies,
and international standards regarding software on a continual basis. Where appropriate,
use of applicable voluntary standards was recommended.
ELECTRONIC PARTS PACKAGING
Vitro coordinated, edited and distributed three quarterly reports covering activi_'ties of the
RELTECH Committee comprising Air Force Rome Laboratory, Naval Surface Warfare
Center, U.S. Army Research Laboratory and NASA. To accelerate issuing reports, a
new format was developed for reporting activities and results. Vitro participated in
various RELTECH meetings such as the Committee meeting in Denver (August 1993)
and RELTECH/ICWG meetings in New Orleans (November 1993) and Fort Lauderdale
(January 1994). Minutes for each Committee meeting were prepared, edited, and
distributed.
Vitro participated in RELTECH technical assessments/surveys of the following
companies:
Texas Instruments (Memory Cubes and MCM Foundry), Dallas, TX
IBM, East Fishkill, NY
Martin Marietta, Orlando, FL
Integrated System Assemblies, Woburn, MA.
At our suggestion, RELTECH completely revised its survey activities and developed
guidelines specifying what areas and subjects are to be covered and the type of
information required.
Vitro attended and participated in the following technical conferences and meetings:
MCM-D & L, Ogonquit, ME, June 1993
Advanced Microelectronics Qualification/Reliability Workshop, August 1993
International Electronics Packaging (IPC) Conference, September 1993
Electronics Industry Quality Council, October 1993
International Society for Hybrid Microelectronics, November 1993
Government Microcircuits Applications Conference, November 1993.
We gave the NASA presentation at the Workshop on MCM-L Reliability, held in
conjunction with the 1993 IPC Conference.
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ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL (EEE) PARTS
Support for the EEE Parts Program area included technical assistance and expertise in
the preparation of procedures and policies, evaluation of Center and contractor
programs, and technical support for technical meetings. (This report covers EEE parts
activity after this technical area was added to this task; prior activity is covered in the
Task Order 1000 final report.) Technical leadership and guidance was provided in the
restructuring of the NASA Parts Steering Committee (NPSC), EEE Parts Research and
Technology Projects, and the EEE Parts Radiation Program. This effort was
accomplished through the development of new NPSC Committee charter and Briefing
Book format, the development of the Integrated Radiation Hardness Design Assurance
(IRHDA) working group charter and strategic plans. Technical direction was provided
in redirecting the large JPL and GSFC RTOP programs to be more responsive to NASA
Center and NASA program needs. Vitro also provided technical direction w_ provided
in redireciiiag and eliminating program waste from the EEE parts radiation programs
and GSFC and JPL, and restructuring the programs into a multi-center IRHDA working
group to share program costs between Headquarters, Centers, and other federal space
agencies. The restructuring of the NPSC and IRHDA program areas accomplished the
integration of similar program elements at each Center into a coordinated strategic
effort, emphasized a customer orientation of the EEE Parts Program elements,
consensus of decision making with participation from all NASA center EEE parts and
Radiation community experts, and the direct application or transition of center field
problems into the EEE Parts and Radiation program elements.
The multi-million dollar "EEE Parts and Radiation Effects" RTOP program at JPL and
GSFC was brought under strategic planning control, and included each of the NASA
participating centers in the NPSC. The strategic planning activity was evaluated in terms
of the changing objectives of the EEE Parts program and new implementation of the
IRHDA program, establishing objectives and deliverables designed to meet the
requirements of all NASA Centers (not just JPL and GSFC), and evaluating the
individual program elements of the EEE Parts and IRHDA programs to determine their
successfully meeting the stated NASA-wide center and program needs. This resulted in a
broadening of Code Q support to other Centers to improve the return-on-investment of
the EEE parts and IRHDA RTOP programs, which had been an ongoing area of
disagreement and dissatisfaction from the viewpoint of the SRM&QA Directors at the
NASA Field Installations and Program Directors of Space Station Freedom (SSF) and
Space Transport System (STS).
Vitro provided technical assessments and oversight to the ongoing systems development
effort of the Electronic Parts Information Management System (EPIMS). Planning and
funding decisions were coordinated between Vitro and NASA Code Q management
elements to review and coordinate complementary funding and management initiatives
between the EPIMS and its mechanical parts equivalent, Mechanical Parts Information
Management System (MePIMS). Coordination requirements and planning meetings
were held with representatives of all NASA Field Installations to address system
planning deficiencies not addressed by GSFC Center management of EPIMS and
MePIMS.
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Vitro also performed assessments of the impact of power transistor (2N3421 - Unitrode)
and tantalum capacitor (Sprague) failure scenarios for Mars Observer failure
investigation team at NASA HQ and Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) (September-
October 1993).
Deliverables:
"Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Management and Control
Requirements for NASA Space Flight Programs," NHB 5300.4(1F), July 1989, Editor and
Contributor.
"Implementation of NASA Standard Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE)
Parts Program," NMI 5320.6A, revised NMI 5320.6B, October 1991, Final Draft.
-"Basic Policy for NASA Space Flight Program Electrical, Electronic, and- -
Electromechanical (EEE) Parts," NMI 5320.5A, revised NMI 5320.5B, May 1991, Final
Draft.
"EEE Parts and Reliability: Data Sharing Survey," Briefing and Stand-alone Data Survey
Compilation Diskette, October 1993, for distribution to AIAA/NSIA Coordination
Meeting and US Space Parts Strategic Steering Committee.
"NASA EEE Parts Program - Integrated Radiation Hardness Assurance Program
(IRHDA) Independent Review Briefing Book," August 1993. Editor and Contributor.
"NASA EEE Parts Program Briefing Book - Review and Prioritization of EEE Parts
Program Tasks," NPSC Meeting, Lewis Research Center (LeRC), July 27-28, 1993.
Editor and Contributor.
"Radiation Hardness Design Assurance For Space Electronics Systems In The 'Better,
Faster, Cheaper' Era," May 1993 - August 1993. Editor and Contributor.
"NASA Strategic Committee on Space Parts Radiation Hardness Assurance," February
1993.
"Space Electronic Parts Infrastructure Assurance (SEPIA): Development Strategy,"
September 1992.
"Parts Manufacturer Survey Evaluation Guide Book," Final Draft, February 1994.
"RADATA DATABANK: A Full Text Retrieval Infobase," FolioVIEWS data retrieval
version of JPL's RADATA Databank, prepared by Vitro and Labat-Anderson, October
1991.
"GIDEP DATA Base: A Full Text Retrieval Infobase," FolioVIEWS data retrieval
version of GIDEP Alert database, prepared by Vitro and Labat-Anderson, October 1991.
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"Grade 2 Parts for the EOS Program," December 1992.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Over the life of Task Order 4000, Vitro has been responsive to OSMA's changing
requirements. We have reorganized our staff to make our organization a reflection of
OSMA's. While the scope of our effort has been altered to reflect OSMA's budget
reality, we have made significant contributions to each technical area. These
accomplishments, described above, have enabled Code QW to expand its budget and
staff and to better serve other NASA programs. Based on our experience working with
Code QW, plus our familiarity with the other NASA programs, we make the following
recommendations to Code QW:
Engineering Stanblaids: The use of appropriate standards ]-s ihe foundation of
NASA's assurance capability. NASA and Code QW need to increase use of
voluntary and DoD standards, reduce reliance on institutional standards and, where
necessary, develop Agencywide standards. Code QW should complete the
development of and then implement an improved process for developing standards
and establish a management system for NASA standards.
Metric Transition: Code QW needs to update the NASA Metric Transition Plan to
reflect the current program responsibilities, budgets, and schedules. Joint efforts
with other government agencies should be expanded to make better use of limited
resources and yet make the fastest reasonable progress on the adoption of the
metric system.
Advanced Technologies: Code QW currently supports selected advanced
technologies. Code QW should consider developing a well-defined procedure for
identifying new areas that deserve support.
Systems Engineering: Code QW participates in several system engineering
initiatives, including the Systems Engineering Process Improvement Team (SEPIT),
the System Engineering Working Group, the Program Excellence Team, and the
National Initiative for Product Data Exchange. Code QW needs to maintain basic
program management information (e.g., goals and objectives, deliverables, schedule,
and budget) on the status of cooperative programs, specifically in a form
appropriate for management briefings. In addition, Code QW must identify
national systems engineering issues and additional opportunities for cooperative
programs.
Software Engineering and Assurance: Code QW's goal is to assist program planning
to the critical evolving areas of NASA software safety, engineering, assurance, and
IV&V technology development. The effort covers NASA's program life cycle, from
requirements definition, through design, test, and independent verification and
validation (IV&V), to operations and maintenance. In the future, Code QW should
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bolster its technical expertise for directing the IV&V Facility, technical assessments,
and preparation of software standards, guidelines, and metrics.
Electronic Parts Packaging and EEE Parts: Code QW should consider integration
of these activities into a broad parts, materials, and processes effort.
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5000 SERIES TASK ORDER
QUALITY AND PRODUCTIVITY AWARENESS PROGRAM/SRM&QA CAREER
DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
After contract award, it was readily apparent to OSMA that a vehicle was needed to
obtain support for the Quality and Productivity Improvement Programs Office (Code
QB). Hence, a Quality and Productivity Awareness Program/SRM&QA Career
Development and Training task order was established to provide this support. Code QB
was officially established by the NASA Administrator to operate under the Associate
Administrator for Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (Code Q).
The Office plays a significant role in advancing NASA's image as a leader i_n n_ational
quality an-d-productivity by promoting quaii_y and productivity improvement programs
within NASA and its contractor community and sharing these improvement initiatives
with other government agencies, educational institutions, the business and industry
community, and professional associations and societies. The task order required Vitro
Corporation to assist Code QB in establishing NASA as a center of excellence through
firm support of Code QB's quality and productivity initiatives; in particular, the
establishment of efficient and effective training and development programs for NASA's
SRM&QA personnel.
II. SUMMARY OF TASK ACTIVITY
Vitro provided technical and administrative support for the SRM&QA Career
Development and Training (CD&T) Program and for the Quality and Productivity
Awareness (Q&PA) Program.
SRM&QA Career Development and Training (CD&T) Program
The SRM&QA Career Development Program (CDP) Plan involved implementation of
an agency SRM&QA CD&T Program. The primary objective of the program was to
provide a structured framework for the training and development of a sufficient number
of SRM&QA engineers and technical specialists to meet NASA's immediate and
projected SRM&QA workforce requirements. A secondary objective was to provide, to
the maximum extent possible, career opportunities that generally satisfy the personal
aspirations of the agency's SRM&QA employees. Therefore, the NASA SRM&QA CDP
Plan was designed to establish NASA as a center of excellence in the training and
development of SRM&QA personnel, meeting both individual and Agency needs. Vitro
planned, coordinated, and implemented all activities associated with the SRM&QA
CD&T Program. Vitro supported and coordinated the Career Development Working
Group (CDWG) activities. Vitro also assisted, as required, the NASA Centers in the
formulation of center career development and training plans and assisted Code QB in
monitoring center career development activities.
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The NASA SRM&QA CDP Plan required each Center to have its own career
development program or system in place and in writing. This latitude was designed to
allow the Centers to tailor their career development program activities to fit center-
unique needs. Also, each Center's SRM&QA Director was required to report the status
of that Center's career development activities to the Associate Administrator for
SRM&QA each year. The NASA SRM&QA CDP Plan also specified the format for the
report.
Vitro also assisted Code QB in identifying and analyzing agency training and
development requirements and sources of training and development activities to fulfill
those requirements. Vitro developed a mechanism for coordinating the planning and
development of agency SRM&QA training so as to more effectively identify unfunded
training requirements and existing training course development initiatives that would
fulfill those requirements. Vitro collected, analyzed information, and made
-recommendations regarding SRM&QA CD&T Program improvements, as required by
Code QB. The primary sources of information were other government agencies,
educational institutions, and industry, as well as the broad base of experience within
NASA.
Vitro conducted a survey of government and industry SRM&QA Training and
Development (T&D) Programs. The Survey of SRM&QA Work Force Training and
Development Programs in Selected Industrial Establishment and Government Organizations
report was designed to document successful long-term T&D programs used in aerospace
and aerospace-related industries for all personnel in general and SRM&QA personnel in
particular. Vitro contacted a wide variety of industrial and government organizations
that have demonstrated successes in SRM&QA and related technical fields to describe
their SRM&QA T&D programs and activities. The survey report provides important
information to be used to refine the NASA SRM&QA Career Development and
Training Programs, as well as in aiding other organizations in designing their own
SRM&QA T&QA programs. These long-range T&D strategies play a major role in
ensuring a sufficient supply of professional engineers and discipline specialists for
SRM&QA.
Vitro also established and maintained an automated SRM&QA Training Courses
Compendium (TCC) Data Base. The TCC Data Base is a compendium of courses,
degree and intern programs, documents, and organizations associated with safety,
reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance, and such related topics as risk
analysis/management, integrated logistics support, and configuration management. This
data base was designed for use in association with the NASA SRM&QA CDP and other
SRM&QA T&D efforts by assisting supervisors and training personnel in determining
sources of SRM&QA T&D activities and materials. Following data base program
development and validation, data entry was accomplished. Vitro coordinated and
installed the TCC Data Base at all NASA Code Divisions and shipped the TCC Data
Base to all NASA Centers complete with the Installation and User's Guide.
Vitro also established a SRM&QA CD&T Library to provide a resource center of
materials to support NASA's SRM&QA CD&T activities. These materials include
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general books on career development, career counseling,training, and similar topics;
college catalogsoutlining numerousSRM&QA courseand degreeprograms; catalogs
and pamphlets regarding NASA professionaldevelopment opportunities at Headquarters
and the centers;brochures concerningcommercially available SRM&QA training; and
related items. The library was located at Vitro's Maryland Avenue office and wasopen
for useby NASA personnel on a walk-in basis. Library materials could also be checked
out to NASA personnel at field center locations.
Quality and Productivity Awareness (Q&PA) Program
The Quality and Productivity Awareness (Q&PA) Program included numerous quality
and productivity initiatives for which Code QB was responsible. Vitro assisted Code QB
in promoting these initiatives. Promotional activities were limited to the preparation of
articles, presentation material, posters, brochures, and pamphlets. Vitro_arranged for the
-development and preparation of a Quality and Productivity presentation package
complete with graphics/viewgraphs for use by the Code QB Director. Vitro also
arranged for the development of a Quality Awareness Training Program for NASA
Headquarters Code Q Supervisors and the conduct of such training.
In addition, Vitro provided technical support for preparation of documents and
publications such as the Quality and Productivity Awareness Newsletter. This support
entailed creative writing/editing of technical and quality awareness material as required
by the Q&PA Program. Vitro also established and maintained a reference library of
books, pamphlets, documents, and papers in support of the Q&PA Program.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Quality and Productivity Awareness Program/SRM&QA Career Development and
Training task orders spanned the period of February 22, 1988 through August 15, 1989,
at which time it was transitioned to another contractor, Information Dynamics, Inc. (IDI)
under a SBA 8(a) set-aside contract. Milestone charts (see attachment) for this period
detail the activities and status of all deliverables. All government-furnished material
held by Vitro Corporation in support of the Quality and Productivity Awareness
Program/SRM&QA Career Development and Training task order was transferred to
IDI, with Mr. Arthur Palmer of the NASA Code QB Office acknowledging receipt on
August 15, 1989.
Due to the decentralized nature of the SRM&QA Career Development and Training
(CD&T) Program, the success or failure of the overall Agencywide NASA SRM&QA
CDP will depend heavily on training and development efforts at the Centers. This places
a heavy burden on the Centers, since they must develop, implement, and support a viable
CDP, and on Code Q, since it must measure success or failure largely through its
evaluation of the Center programs. It was Vitro's opinion that, at the time of task
transition to IDI, two center CDP plans were excellent (ARC, LeRC); two were good
(KSC, SSC); two were inadequate (GSFC, MSFC); and two were not yet developed
(JSC, JPL). One Center (LaRC) insisted that it would not participate formally. All
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Centers must develop program plans as viable as those at ARC, LeRC, KSC, and SSC
for the overall Agencywide program to succeed.
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5000 SERIES TASK ORDER
soFrWARE INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION SUPPORT
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
In 1992, NASA began construction of a Software Independent Verification and
Validation (IV&V) Facility in Fairmont, West Virginia. The Facility serves as a NASA
resource and center of excellence for software IV&V research, application, and training
that enhance project support to the NASA mission. This series of task orders was
created to provide the IV&V Facility (Code QV) with software IV&V expertise to assist
in the development, integration, and operation of the Software IV&V Facility. Vitro
provided software IV&V support from November 8, 1993 through February 10, 1994.
II. SUMMARY OF TASK ACTIVITY
The Vitro software IV&V staff personnel assisted in planning and development of the
first NASA IV&V workshop, which was held December 13-16, 1993 and attended by
over 150 software IV&V experts. This subtask entailed defining the scope and thrust of
the workshop, identifying and obtaining commitments from candidate speakers and
workshop leaders, preparing announcements, and other assistance as required. Vitro
personnel also was asked to co-chair the Criticality session.
Vitro also assisted in preparing a Software IV&V Strategic Plan to integrate the overall
requirements and proposed products associated with the Software IV&V Facility.
Vitro was asked to assist in developing an interim Statement of Work for the
International Space Station Alpha IV&V effort to be performed by the Software IV&V
Facility. This subtask entailed planning activities to be performed between February
1994 and September 1994.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Deliverables were accurate and timely, and fully satisfied NASA requirements. The
requirements of task order were well defined; therefore, no recommendations are
provided.
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6000 SERIES TASK ORDER
ADMINISTRATION
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
After contract award, it was readily apparent that a vehicle was needed to obtain the
administrative and financial reporting requirements associated with the contract. Hence,
a separate task order for Administration was established. The Administration task order
encompassed the full spectrum of administrative and financial support needed to provide
quick response to NASA Code Q requirements. The Administration task order required
Vitro Corporation to employ personnel with expertise in task order management,
budgeting and cost performance reporting, subcontract/consultant administration,
resources management, logistics, security program administration, gove _n3ment property
-administration, facilities management, _nformation management system, and conflict of
interest avoidance. The Administration task orders spanned the period of February 22,
1988 through February 10, 1994. Staff support task orders (formerly 8000 series) became
a part of this series in August 1992.
II. SUMMARY OF TASK ACTIVITY
Vitro Corporation Administration staff personnel provided financial reports as required
under NASA Headquarters contract NASW-4311 and associated task orders using the
Contractor Financial Management Report (NASA Forms 533M and 533Q) and a
specially generated and formatted biweekly report (see attachment). The Contracting
Officer (CO) and the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) approved
the reporting formats in content and design, and also established the delivery schedule.
The biweekly reports provided a cost breakdown by major elements, and included
manpower and budget information required to successfully manage the contract. On
their own initiative, Vitro Administration staff personnel also designed, developed, and
produced budget and cost graphs (see attachment) on a biweekly basis. The graphs were
extremely useful in managing and controlling contract costs as trends were easily
identified. The COTR readily recognized the value of the graphs and made them a task
order deliverable. The standard NASA monthly and quarterly financial reports,
specialized biweekly budget and cost reports, and biweekly budget and cost graphs
enabled NASA to properly monitor contractor cost performance at the task order and
job summary level (hours and cost). The financial reports also furnished the Vitro
Program Manager and his staff with the data needed for planning, budgeting, and cost
control. The quality and timeliness of these reports were superior.
Vitro established a system for identifying and tracking NASA Safety, Reliability,
Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) contractual conflicts of interest. A
procedure was established to identify all potential conflicts of interests in the pursuit of
new business and to obtain CO approval. No conflict of interests were experienced
throughout the performance of the contract.
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In the area of subcontract/consultant administration, Vitro was highly effective in
obtaining specialized short-term support in a timely and effective manner through
subcontract/consultant agreements in areas where we did not have the in-house
expertise.
On a monthly basis, Vitro Administration personnel updated, reviewed, and submitted
the Government Property Report to the Corporate Property Office for subsequent
submittal to the Government. All Government equipment was returned to NASA prior
to the contract completion date.
After the merger of SRM&QA support (see 8000 series task order) into this task order
in 1993, Vitro continued to provide technical writing and editing support for
management reports, presentations, and other special projects for the Code Q
management and engineering staff. Vitro also provided technical editing, word_
-processing, and publications preparation support for assigned documents generated
for/by Code Q management and engineering staff as described in other tasks, including
NASA Management Issuances, NASA Handbooks, position papers, and technical reports.
Vitro also assisted management and engineering staff in the preparation of Code Q
presentation materials (viewgraphs, slides, brochures, insets, etc.) for management
reviews and technical presentations. Critical deliveries included NHB 1700.1, "Safety
Policy and Requirements Document," NSS 1740.12, "NASA Safety Standard for
Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics," and quarterly reports summarizing the
accomplishments of the RELTECH Steering Committee and Teams.
Vitro also continued its administrative support to the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP). The main thrust of this support focused on assisting the Panel in generating the
ASAP Report. In 1993, Vitro employees were recognized for excellent publication
support to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Assessment Team, an ad hoc task
forced created by ASAP to conduct a thorough assessment of the risks that the SSME
poses to the safe operation of the Space Shuttle.
In the latter phase of the contract, Vitro provided support for the maintenance and
upgrade of administrative data systems (e.g., budget systems, action tracking systems,
etc.) to meet Code Q management and engineering requirements.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The deliverables were accurate and timely, and fully satisfied NASA requirements to
monitor the SRM&QA contract to the task level. Additional support in tangible areas
other than scheduled requirements was provided in an expedient and professional
manner. The majority of the requirements of the Administration task order were well-
defined as they are standardized throughout NASA. This is especially the case in the
area of financial reporting. Therefore, no recommendations are provided.
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7000 SERIES TASK ORDER
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
Shortly after contract award, the NASA Code Q management requested that a separate
task order for Program Management be established whereby NASA Code Q would have
more direct visibility into the overall Vitro management activities at a program level.
This separate task order also gave NASA Code Q a more direct instrument under which
to evaluate the Vitro Program Manager's performance and effectiveness.
II. SUMMARY OF TASK ACTIVITY
The Program Management task was essentially one of managing the entire Vitro support
effort, paying particular attention to providing responsive and quality technical support
within budget. This was fully accomplished during the contract period.
Vitro provided all the technical, engineering, and management skills/disciplines
necessary to assist NASA Code Q in its overall mission being responsive to task direction
from Code Q. Vitro performed these functions with a skill mix that continuously evolved
to fulfill changing Code Q requirements as Code Q itself adapted to a changing NASA
environment. Vitro adapted its organizational structure and staffing throughout the life
of the contract to reflect the changes required by Code Q. Vitro assigned personnel with
indepth experience attuned to the needs of Code Q. When needs changed, Vitro rapidly
responded by utilizing Vitro corporate resources and subcontracted with highly talented
specialists or other contractors. This enabled Vitro to quickly adjust staffing levels and
skills to meet short-term workload variations and requirements.
Responsiveness to Code Q was crucial and Vitro was most effectively located within
close walking distance to NASA Headquarters. The ability to personally interface with
Code Q staff on a daily basis without losing productive time in travel was invaluable and
advantageous to Code Q.
Vitro gained an understanding of the "protocol" involved (e.g., that OSMA must approve
and in some cases make the initial contact) when interfacing on a technical level with
elements at a Field Installation or with associated program-related contractor personnel.
Vitro established numerous important SRM&QA points of contact at the nine NASA
Field Installations and with supporting SRM&QA and program contractors and used
these contacts on a daily basis to support Code Q.
Vitro developed significant integration processes and actively participated in Space
Shuttle SRM&QA continuous process improvement-related activities at the NASA
manned spaceflight Field Installations. Space Shuttle enhancement reviews suggested by
Vitro were implemented to integrate long-term SRM&QA Field Installation process
improvement efforts. Vitro produced the Space Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance
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(S&MA) Operating Plan and a process improvement matrix for Space Shuttle S&MA to
assist in controlling process improvement activities. Vitro helped develop a Code Q
Process Improvement Plan to help integrate Code Q process improvement efforts and to
advocate SRM&QA improvements to the Space Shuttle program.
Vitro assisted Code Q in assessing and communicating complex Space Station Electrical
Power System (EPS) stability issues to Space Station program managers. Vitro
performed critical design evaluations of the Day-Of-Launch I-Loads Uplink (DOLILU)
processor systems software development, providing OSMA with a strong rationale for
advocating an Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) activity leading to the
Space Shuttle Project Office funding a full IV&V effort. Vitro assisted Code Q in
identifying critical dynamical issues related to the rendezvous and docking aspects of the
forthcoming U.S./Russian Spacelab/Mir Mission (SLM). Vitro also introduced the idea
for and assisted Code Q in implementing an integrating function, the Poten_tial _
Issue/Problem Identification Committee (PIPIC), for independent assessments that
require coordination and support across a number of different functional areas. Vitro
developed procedures/software for document management that are now in use within
Code Q.
Vitro personnel have received over 200 awards, commendations, and recognitions from
Code Q and other NASA and NASA-related industry organizations. Some of these
awards are for engineering support to technical interagency panels such as the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP),
and the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)/National Security Industrial Association
(NSIA)/NASA Liaison Panel. Further awards resulted from our support to the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Radiation Effects and Testing Group, where Vitro
engineers helped JPL in their increased focus on electronic, electrical, and
electromechanical (EEE) parts. The Vitro Safety and Engineering Assurance Group
twice received the NASA Headquarters Special Service Group Honor Award. Vitro
personnel also received personal recognition for technical assessments and support to
Code Q, which included commendations for risk management/assessment and
probabilistic failure analysis recognized at NASA Headquarters and Marshall Space
Flight Field Installation, technical support to the LOX/LH2 Explosion Hazards program,
technical assessments on space flight data recorders and qualification of hardware by
similarity, and development of software policies and standards. Vitro conducted a
prelaunch assessment of cracks in the hinge of the External Tank doors on STS-37R.
This assessment provided Code Q with technical rationale to delay the launch until
problems were corrected. The Vitro engineer who performed the assessment was later
honored with the Manned Flight Awareness Award, one of five such prestigious Manned
Flight Awareness Awards received by Vitro personnel during the tenure of the contract.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Vitro contract effort has been managed extremely well. Vitro overcame a start-up
problem to provide outstanding support to NASA Code Q, providing them with special
and unique SRM&QA expertise not resident within NASA Headquarters. During the
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entire period of the contract, Vitro's effort was always under budget. In addition, Vitro
has had eight "excellent," two "very good", and one "good" award fee ratings over the
duration of the contract,. The "good" rating was for the very first 6-month period when
Vitro was in the startup phase of the 6-year effort. It should be especially noted that
Vitro's "excellent" performance was maintained for a majority of a significant
"downsizing" period, in which the Vitro staffing was essentially reduced from a high of
approximately 102 persons to a final staffing of approximately 48 persons, a 53% cut in
personnel. During these trying times, Vitro personnel maintained extraordinary
professionalism, continuing to provide outstanding support to NASA Code Q.
A significant factor in Vitro's providing outstanding support to Code Q has been the
sense of "teamwork" instilled amongst NASA and Vitro personnel. We are firmly
convinced that the "team" concept begun under Mr. George Rodney and further
_enhanced/encouraged_under Col. Frederick Gregory is the reason for not only_ Vitro's
outstanding performance, but also the successes attained by NASA Code Q. It is only
when the people working on a program/project really feel that they are an essential part
of it, do they perform at their best. Such a relationship must continue.
Vitro encourages and recommends that NASA Code Q continue and expand upon the
"team" concept already established between Code O and its support contractor. NASA
should not establish a relationship that keeps its support contractor at "arms length";
"teamwork" leads to better communication, which in turn leads to increased performance,
which ultimately benefits NASA and the contractor as well.
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8000SERIES TASK ORDER
SRM&QA STAFF SUPPORT
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
Shortly after contract award, OSMA (Code Q) management determined that a separate
task order for SRM&QA Staff Support was needed. As a result, Vitro formed a
Technical Support group was formed to provide administrative support directly to the
Associate Administrator, Deputy Associate Administrator, and their immediate staff.
Shortly thereafter, this support was matrixed across all task orders. In 1992, at the
request of the COTR, all technical support was consolidated under Institutional and
Resources Management (Code QM). The SRM&QA Staff Support task orders spanned
the period of August 11, 1988 through_August 10, 1992, at wh_ic_h time they were
-transitioned to the Administrative Support Task.
II. SUMMARY OF TASK ACTIVITY
During the contract period, Vitro provided office automation and local area network
systems, technical editing, word processing, and publications preparation support for a
wide range of assigned documents generated for and by the Associate Administrator,
Deputy Associate Administrator, and Code Q division managers as described in other
tasks. This effort included NASA Management Instructions and Handbooks, Safety
Standards, Guidebooks, position papers, management plans, technical assessments,
technical specifications for ADP/T products and services, and technical reports. Vitro
also assisted management and engineering staff in the preparation of Code Q
presentation materials (viewgraphs, slides, brochures, insets, etc.) for numerous high-level
management reviews and technical presentations, and provided support for special
studies. This work was frequently accomplished under very tight deadlines and with
minimal direction from Code Q.
Vitro supported and assisted in the development of several major Code Q speeches;
namely, an "NDE for the Nineties" speech, Chapter 9 of the AIAA Handbook on
Astronautics, the "Road Map To Excellence" speech for the NSIA Conference, the 'q'QM
in Perspective" and 'q'QM -- The Move From Product to Process Control" speeches for
the First Total Quality Management Symposium, speakers' notes and vugraphs for the
NASA Management Training course, a speech for Mr. George Rodney for the Reliability
and Maintainability Symposium; development of an independent study in response to
Congress Roe's letter concerning control of SRM&QA program funds, development of
position papers on five Augustine Report recommendations, development of a technical
paper/speech on Space Product Assurance in the 1990s for delivery at ESTEC; the
"Testing in the Twenty First Century" speech for the 12th Aerospace Testing Seminar;
the "Assuring Safety and Mission Success for Space Station Freedom" paper and speech
for the International Symposium on Reliability and Maintainability; and the Critical
Safety Assurance Factors for Manned Spacecraft" paper for the 41st Congress of the
International Astronautical Federation (IAF).
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Vitro also provided technical writing and editing support for the Hubble Space
TelescopeBoard of Investigation and the Human Error Incidents review at KSC; and
development of designs,color renderings,line-drawings,and 3-D concept models for the
George M. Low, NASA Quality and ExcellenceAward, Trophy.
Vitro provided administrative support to the AerospaceSafety Advisory Panel (ASAP).
This effort consistedof providing editorial, graphics,original cover art aswell as
computer graphics,and publications engineeringsupport to the Panel to assistthem in
developing the ASAP Annual Report and supporting the annual briefing to the
Administrator. Vitro's graphicsstaff developeda unique report cover depicting the
particular theme of the year'swork.
Vitro personnel provided support for the OSMA File/Records Conversion task. We
were able to use our comprehensiveknowledgeof file managementsystemsto assistin
the de;cel0pmentof Division file managerffentplans. This laid the groundwork for Code
Q to continue this task in-house.
Vitro also provided support for the maintenanceand upgrade of administrative data
systems(e.g., budget systems,action tracking systems,etc.) to meet Code Q management
and engineeringrequirements.
The Vitro technical support staff was recognizedfor outstanding performance of critical
writing and editing assignments. Included were the prestigious Manned Flight Award
(MFA) and letters of commendationsfor outstanding and professional support to the
Office of the Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Quality (now Mission
Assurance),Interagency Nuclear SafetyReview Panel, and ASAP. One employeewas
cited for excellentwriting support to NASA quality and productivity improvement
programs.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Deliverables for this task order were accurate, timely, and fully responsive to Code Q's
requirements. A significant factor in the success of Vitro's Technical Support effort for
Code Q has been the sense of "teamwork" between NASA and Vitro personnel. Vitro
recommends that Code Q continue to expand and improve this "team" concept.
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9000 SERIES TASK ORDER
SPACE FLIGHT SAFETY AND MISSION ASSURANCE
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
This task series was originally formed to provide the NASA Programs Assurance
Division (Code QP) with engineering and technical support for the Space Shuttle
Program, Space Station Freedom (Level I), Spacelab, Expendable Launch
Vehicles/Upper Stages (ELV/US), Payloads, and for Aeronautics and Space Exploration
activities. The primary purpose of this support has been to enhance Code QP's ability to
maintain a current knowledge and understanding of program status to support reviews of
major problems, issues and concerns, and flight readiness. Code QP also required
technical support for related program efforts such as the modification of prpgram - Safety,
Reliability, Maintainability, and Ouality ,_surance (SRM&QA) documents.
In December 1992, a Code Q reorganization resulted in the Payload Programs being
transferred to the Quality Management (Payloads) Division (Code QT). In addition, the
Space Shuttle safety group within the Safety Division (Code QS) was transferred to the
Space Flight Safety and Mission Assurance Division (Code QP). The Division assumed
the responsibility for the Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) reports, and the safety tasks
transferred within Vitro to this task order.
In January 1994, the Expendable Launch Vehicle/Upper Stage (ELV/US) programs, the
Aeronautics (Code R) programs, and the Advanced Concepts and Technologies (Code
C) programs were transferred to the Payloads and Aeronautics Division (Code QT).
Again, Vitro resources have been adjusted to support the new realignment of tasks for
the NASA Code Q Divisions.
II. SUMMARY OF TASK ACTIVITY
Vitro's approach has been to assign engineers, with directly related experience, to
participate in reviews such as management, planning, engineering assessment, status,
processing, change control, design, and flight readiness, with the objective of ensuring
SRM&QA concerns were identified and appropriately addressed. Vitro also provided
technical support for the modification of program documents, and sent qualified
individuals to support all Level I/II Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB)
telecons and related program technical meetings. Typical products were quick response
technical assessments of SRM&QA issues and concerns, bi-weekly reports, monthly
reports, trip reports, and special topic technical reports on significant issues, such as
process-related problems. Vitro also modified numerous documents for Code QP, and
recommended changes to program documents to enhance the SRM&QA requirements
effectiveness.
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Space Shuttle Program
The Vitro engineering team has very been successful in providing technical assessments
and reports of SRM&QA issues and concerns for the many Space Shuttle missions flown
throughout the contract period. The NASA Associate Administrator for Safety and
Mission Assurance (Code Q) commended the entire Vitro engineering support team for
Code QP as follows: " The proof of your competence and one of the products that
reflects your ability to succinctly summarize the key issues for top management, is the
Biweekly Report."
Space Shuttle documents, such as the Contingency Action Plan and the Launch and
Mission Support Plan, have been significantly revised to reflect the changes in Code Q
management and processes. Vitro engineers developed a Space Shuttle Program
Enhancement Review Process plan and Operating plan to define a revie_w process that
K,ould assist Code QP in advocating SRM&QA changes for the long-term enhancement
of the Space Shuttle Program.
One of the key Vitro Space Shuttle engineers developing these plans was honored as a
Manned Flight Awareness Honoree for his outstanding technical contributions and
judgment and the development of an Enhancement Review Process Plan in support of
the Space Shuttle Program, thus contributing to each mission's success.
Space Shuttle Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report
Since the MSE and safety efforts were transferred to this task, the MSE report process
has been evaluated using Continuous Process Improvement techniques to enhance the
product. The results of two customer surveys and the process review led to a
restructuring of the Vitro process to improve the quality and technical accuracy of the
MSE report. Significant format changes have been made to facilitate Vitro engineers in
updating and changing information, while reducing production costs. The Vitro engineer
who managed this effort was recently honored by NASA as a Manned Flight Awareness
Honoree, in recognition of his efforts to provide the SRM&QA and Space Shuttle
Program communities with a single source of risk assessment information, as a
contribution to each mission's success.
Space Station Freedom (Level I)
The Space Station Freedom was restructured and redesigned in August 1993 as the new
International Space Station Alpha. Much of the work completed during the many
Preliminary (PDRs) and Critical Design Reviews (CDRs) held prior to that time is being
re-evaluated in light of the new design and cost constraints. Some of the significant
efforts Vitro engineers performed on CDRs for the Canadian Space Agency (Remote
Manipulator System), and the Italian Space Agency (Mini Pressurized Logistics Module)
will endure, since the International Space Station Alpha is not expected to impact these
International Partner elements. The RIDs were written against the CDR documents to
enhance the SRM&QA requirements effectiveness. Since the new contract does not
require Space Station support, this work has been turned over to NASA.
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Another significant SpaceStation effort involved the stability requirements for the Space
Station Electric Power System(EPS). Vitro engineershave identified potential
instabilities causedby the inadequatespecification of load impedance characteristics.
While the EPS design for SpaceStation Freedom is being changedfor the International
SpaceStation Alpha, the sameproblems existwith the impedance specifications.
Support for this work will continue during the transition of the support effort to NASA.
Expendable Launch Vehicles/Upper Stages, and Spacelab
Vitro engineers have participated in the full range of design, flight readiness, and range
safety reviews for the many ELV/US and Spacelab missions flown during this contract.
Significant areas of achievement include assisting Code QP in the coordination of the
commercial ELV launch SRM&QA policy with DOT, USAF and NASA, and the
commercial ELV community. Vitro engineers were instrumental in gain_ing program and
Code Q support for the Laser Initiated Ordnance program. Their technical expertise
was used to support the special teams formed to investigate the TOS ACTS Super*Zip
Anomaly on STS-51 and the Tethered Satellite Anomaly on STS-46. Again, their
technical expertise and the exceptional technical support to Code QP has been noted in
letters of commendation.
Vitro engineers have formed a process improvement team to address the long-term and
flight-to-flight issues associated with each type of ELV program. The result of their
efforts is the Safety and Mission Assurance Review Telecon (SMART) Operating Plan.
This plan recommends a process to Code QP for reviewing significant SRM&QA issues
and concerns for each ELV mission, similar to the Space Shuttle Prelaunch Assessment
Review. The review will include the NASA and industry ELV SRM&QA community to
discuss issues related to both the specific mission, the launch vehicle, and the launch
facility. The intent is to aid the SRM&QA community in coordinating process
improvements that will contribute to mission success.
Payloads and Missions
At the time the payloads and mission programs transferred to the Quality Management
(Payloads) Division (Code QT), the Vitro engineering support had been providing
detailed, rapid-response, technical assessments of SRM&QA issues and concerns. Also,
the engineers reviewed and recommended changes to NASA documents, such as NASA
contract SRM&QA requirements, to enhance the effectiveness of SRM&QA
requirements imposed on their Payloads programs. Their recommendations spanned the
full range of the Payloads program design and mission life cycle, from the Phase A/B
conceptual design processes to the flight performance.
Since the transfer of the Payloads programs to Code QT, the Vitro engineers assigned to
support Code QT have assisted in the development of a Cost of Quality seminar.
Engineers on the Code QP task supported that effort, with the intent of expanding the
emphasis beyond Payload programs to include the Space Shuttle, Space Shuttle/Mir,
International Space Station Alpha, and Spacelab programs.
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Aeronautics and Space Exploration Programs
Significant efforts for this program area include assisting Code QP in the establishment
of SRM&QA requirements within the Code C Centers for the Commercial Development
of Space (CCDS) Programs, and establishing safety requirements for commercial
customers flying experiments on the Space Shuttle. Vitro engineers have assisted Code
QP in establishing SRM&QA requirements for the Shuttle/MIR program with their
Russian Space Agency counterparts. Significant technical issues have been identified
with the docking dynamics between the Space Shuttle and the Mir Space Station, with
the Space Shuttle plume impingement, and with the Mir attitude control system. These
issues are being worked as part of the Shuttle/Mir programs effort, and will continue to
be worked as part of the new contract. Vitro's unique technical support for these issues
has been recognized by Code QP.
Special Program Support
As part of this contract, and part of the Payloads program effort for this task, Vitro
provided special optical engineering quality assurance support to the NASA Associate
Administrator for Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance, Code Q,
during his participation on the Hubble Space Telescope Board of Investigation (also
know as the Allen Committee). The Board was formed to determine how the error was
made in the Space Telescope's Primary Mirror during its manufacturing process, and
remained undetected until the telescope was placed into orbit. Vitro supplied
engineering and management support for this effort, and contributed to the "SRM&QA
Observations and Lessons Learned" report published in October 1990. The optical
support continued during the redesign effort and First Servicing Mission flown on STS-61
in December 1993 to correct the optics. Due to the successful quality assurance efforts
of the Vitro optical subcontractor, the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF)
program has requested Code Q to provide similar independent optical quality assurance
for their program.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While the requirements for technical and engineering support for the programs will
remain, the direction within NASA has been to work more closely with each program to
solve process problems. Vitro has recommended and will continue to recommend
recurrence control for process problems as they are identified by our technical
evaluations and assessments. NASA should incorporate the Space Shuttle Enhancement
Review program approved during this task period, as time permits. Due to the fact that
the Space Shuttle Program is a mature program, costs savings can only result by
reviewing the SRM&QA processes to determine which processes provide the best value,
and changing those that provide the least. Similarly, the SMART program for the ELV
programs should be implemented to provide a forum for discussing mutual SRM&QA
issues within the ELV SRM&QA community. Vitro engineers, in conjunction with the
Division Director, have been drafting an Operating Plan for the Space Shuttle Program
to provide a forum within Code Q for discussing and coordinating all of the RTOP
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programs and field installation programs that impact that program. With the diverse
efforts currently being performed within Code Q, and a need to reduce program costs
while providing a complete program of support for the Space Shuttle Program, this
forum will provide a process for advocating SRM&QA changes to the Program Office.
Quality products such as the Cost of Quality seminar should be expanded to programs
other than Payloads. The real value of the Cost of Quality concept is that it
complements the Continuous Process Improvement techniques, while providing a process
to focus improvements based on useful metrics.
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10000 SERIES TASK ORDER
SPACE STATION FREEDOM PROGRAM
SAFETY AND PRODUCT ASSURANCE SUPPORT
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE OVERALL TASK
The NASA Space Station Freedom Program Office Level II Safety and Product
Assurance Office (DSQ) responsibility was for the planning, direction, implementation,
and evaluation of SSFP systems assurance including systems safety, reliability,
maintainability, and quality assurance including software product assurance. DSQ
provided for overall independent technical review of SSFP/projects to ensure
development efforts and mission operations were being conducted on a sound
engineering basis with proper controls and attention to development risk. In afldition,
-DSQ performed revZie_, and oversight activities to help ensure that the design and
operational procedures prepared for the SSF payloads and experiments were
accomplished to preclude the occurrence of hazards that could cause loss of life or injury
of the crew; cause loss of, or significant degradation to the SSF; and in normal
operations, cause damage to other elements. DSQ also was responsible to ensure that
the Director and Deputy Director, SSFPO, and other principal officials were aware of
SRM&QA matters pertaining to the technical execution and physical readiness of the
SSFP and related projects.
Vitro provided DSQ with the necessary technical and managerial skill and expertise in
providing multi-discipline support in the principal functional areas of safety, reliability
maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA).
II. SUMMARY OF TASK ACTIVITY
This task series required Vitro to provide management, safety, reliability, quality
assurance, and software produce assurance support.
Management Support
Vitro provided technical engineering support to perform assigned engineering tasks as
directed by the Safety and Product Assurance Office Managers. Vitro helped to ensure
that the Level II Space Station Freedom Program engineering activities complied with
program requirements by providing superior independent technical assessment and
oversight of the Level II/III S&PA guidance, direction, and priorities established by DSQ
managers.
Vitro management was totally committed to the development and implementation of (1)
a safety program that supported the challenges of safely establishing, operating and
maintaining space station; (2) a reliability/maintainability program that identified,
corrected, or controlled critical design weaknesses, repair requirements, and resources;
(3) software defined and developed to a level of quality consistent with program
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requirements and goals; and (4) a quality assurance program that verified compliance
with the Space Station Freedom program requirements.
Safety Support
Vitro safety engineers supported evolution of SSF program safety documentation (SSP
30000, Section 9, Program Definition and Requirements Document; SSP 30309, Safety
Analysis and Risk Assessment Requirements; SSP 30599, SSFP Safety Review Process;
SSP 30688, SSFP Integrated Safety Program Plan; SSP 30652, SSFP Payload Safety
Requirements; SSP 30685, SSFP Hazard Data base System Requirements Definition
Document) through participation in the development of major program safety
requirements and review of draft documents to ensure comprehensive inclusion of
programmatic safety requirements. Vitro safety engineers interacted with program
participants to review and integrate draft modifications in response to program_wide
reviews, and prepared and presented CRs to the Integration 1Vlanagement Review
(IMR), pre-Space Station Control Board (SSCB), and SSCB. Vitro also monitored
progress of the documents through the SSFP review and approval process.
The Vitro safety engineers performed independent Change Evaluations (CEs) of more
than 300 CRs to modify existing Space Station documents or baseline new documents.
In many instances, the safety engineers worked with the program engineers who were the
proponents of CRs to revise them in an effort to remove any adverse safety impacts prior
to presentation to the SSCB. The safety engineers performed independent assessments
of Level II Systems Engineering and Integration safety products for the Space Station
Safety Office. Chief among these were assessments of the Integrated Safety Preliminary
Design Review (ISPDR) Integrated Safety Assessment Report, the Man-Tended
Capability (MTC) Phase Review Integrated Safety Assessment Report, the Integrated
Risk Assessment Reports for Stages 1 through 4, and the Program Incremental Design
Review (PIDR-93).
Vitro safety engineers actively participated in Space Station Freedom (SSF) level, Work
Package (WP) level, prime contractor, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and International
Partner (IP) design reviews of flight hardware/software, ground support equipment, data
systems, engineering support centers, and processing facilities. The safety engineers
attended design presentations, reviewed design documentation, performed design
assessments, developed Review Item Discrepancy (RID) reports, and participated on
design review teams to disposition RIDs. At major milestone reviews (e.g., ISPDR,
MTC Phase Review, and the Program Incremental Design Review), Vitro was
responsible for performing independent global safety risk assessments. Using insights
gained during participation in major milestone reviews, the safety engineers assisted the
Safety Manager in developing safety risk assessments and presentations. Review
participation included three major milestone reviews: the ISPDR and the MTC Phase
Review and the Program Incremental Design Review. Other reviews supported included
the WP-2 Distributed Systems Preliminary Design Review (PDR), the Canadian Space
Agency (CSA) Interim Design Review (IDR), the WP-2 Delta PDR, the CSA Delta
PDR, the KSC Ground Handling Equipment PDR, the KSC Core Electronics Contract
PDR, the CSA Engineering Support Center PDR, the CSA Mobile Servicing System
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Software Delta IDR, the WP-1 Delta PDR, the Central Software Facility/Central
Avionics Facility SystemRequirements Review, the Communications and Tracking
SystemGround Support Equipment PDR, the Flight SystemSoftware Requirements
Review, the National SpaceDevelopment Agency (NASDA) JapaneseExperimental
Module PDR, the European SpaceAgency (ESA) Attached PressurizedModule System
Requirements Review, and the CSA SpaceStation Remote Manipulator SystemCDR.
The Vitro safety engineersassistedin the development and implementation of the
Freedom Safety Review Panel (FSRP), which is still used to conduct independent safety
reviews of the Space Station Manned Base (SSMB) configuration/operations for each
stage of the SSMB construction and development. The safety engineers provided
technical review of the Safety Compliance Data Packages (SCDP) from each WP or IP.
Vitro safety engineers supported the FSRP chairman at each safety review by
identifying/recording issues, concerns, and required actions; researching requirements;
preparing summary reports, and _ssuring ihe accuracy of, and concurrence witfi, t-he
minutes of the joint FSRP/Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) safety reviews.
Vitro safety engineers supported development of safety associated SSF programwide data
bases through participation in various Technical Management Information System
(TMIS) Joint Application Development conferences and the conduct of programwide
data base needs assessments. Safety engineers interfaced with program participants to
establish data collection, system business processes, process work flow, business priorities,
data needs, data flow and, used the information to develop chapters for the data base
requirements definition document. The safety engineers conducted user acceptance
testing of data base functionality and user interfaces and reviewed user documentation
for accuracy and comprehensiveness.
Vitro safety engineers actively supported the Space Station Safety Office in the conduct
of four major safety-related trade studies. The studies addressed Space Station
emergency egress scenarios, module arrangement, and translation paths; manual power
switches to control electrical power to module equipment and payload racks; proper
settings for ground fault interrupters; and fire detection and suppression system
components definition and locations. The studies required extensive coordination with
Space Station Work Package 1, 2, and 4 engineers, IPs, contractors, consultants, industry
sources, and NASA activities.
Reliability and Maintainability Support
The Vitro Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) team was deeply involved in the
attainment of mission success and the goal to assure that the Space Station will be
reliable and maintainable over its life span. Vitro R&M engineers participated in every
facet of the Space Station program -- from basic requirements definition and the
generation of plans to very detailed engineering analysis through the use of mathematical
simulation models. Vitro provided R&M engineering capabilities in direct support
providing rapid response to many problems and action requests. Vitro R&M engineers
demonstrated an innate sense of responsibility and urgency, which resulted in an
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appreciation of teamwork, continuous process improvement, and interactive participation
required for a meaningful SSF product assurance program. Specific examples of direct
SSF program participation included:
Submission of many Review Item Discrepancies for R&M requirements which
surfaced at the Integrated System Preliminary Design Review, the Man Tended
Capability Phase Preliminary Design Review, and the Program Incremental Design
Review-93.
Submission of CRs for the Program Definition and Requirements Document,
Section 9 Data Requirements and baselining of the Level II R&M Program Plan,
evaluation of numerous CRs dealing with design requirements; and complete
traceability of R&M requirements from SSP 30000, Sections 3 and 9 down to Level
III Contract End Item specification_s.
Documentation and planning tasks, including the total development of a
comprehensive Reliability & Maintainability Program Plan (TSS 30579) for Level
II; development of S&PA support plans for the ISPDR, MTC Phase PDR, and
MTC CDR.
Closure of many action items dealing with subjects as diverse as the CSA ground
segment and design review traceability; development of an R&M data base for
audits, findings, observations, and corrective actions; development of the Level II
S&PA Verification Assessment Plan to be included as a volume of the Program
Master Verification Plan, SSP 30666, and development of a NASA Handbook for
the preparation of FMEA/CILs, which if implemented will affect every NASA
program.
Work performed by the R&M team in an oversight role include team membership and
leadership during Level II, Level III, and IP technical milestone and design reviews;
audits and R&M data reviews at the WPs and IPs; IP meet-or-exceed reviews and data
exchange agreements; verification assurance; analysis of the SSF two-failure-tolerant
attitude control function design; training in the Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) Data Base for review and analysis of failures;
and S&PA representation in the working group which analyzed the various DC-to-DC
Converter Unit location options.
Management activities included active participation in the Redundancy Management
Panel; program, DSQ and R&M stand-up meetings; Electrical, Electronic
Electromagnetic (EEE) Parts Advisory Board, Program Verification Panel; Mission
Integration Review group; PDR and CDR planning groups; model development and
analysis working group; TMIS data base and application meetings, including the Failure
Environment Analysis Tool/Digraph Development Group; and the program SRM&QA
Managers' teleconferences.
Vitro's technical analytic endeavors include the performance of availability modeling
through the construction of reliability block diagrams and the calculation of availability
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figures for SSFsurvival functions using a Monte Carlo simulation model, the assessment
of changesin availability due to redesign changesin MTBF and MTI'R, and the
identification of weak lines in the design. The Event Time Availability Reliability
Analysis (ETARA) model wasused to calculate the reliability and availability of the
early SpaceStation Freedom Stages(1-6). The purposewas to make design tradeoffs for
a number of configurations of the survival functions and stagedurations. It was found,
for example, that maintenance flights would be needed if Stagedurations exceeded3
months,and that reliability was significantly enhancedby using actively cooled dc-dc
converters.
Additionally, Vitro R&M engineersparticipated in a select team evaluation of SSF
R&M data bases,and made the recommendation that all program offices utilize a
_onsistentmethod to assessOrbital Replacement Unit failure rates, life limits, and repair
times. Vitro R&M engineersperformed an independent assessmentof the SSFMaster
-Verification Requirements and the Verification Responsibility-/Vlatrix.Tlaeyalso actively
participated in the KSC Cargo Element Lifting Assembly CDR, the delta Software
Requirements Review for the SSFCentral SoftwareFacility and Central Avionics
Facility, the Ground SystemsProgram Review, the KSC SSFProcessingFacility
Ammonia Servicing System, the KSC Removable Overhead Access Platform, the ESA
System Requirements Review, the NASDA Japanese Experiment Module PDR, and the
CSA Engineering Support Center CDR.
Vitro R&M engineers interfaced with the Space Station IPs on a frequent basis. We
participated in the European Space Agency Preliminary Requirements Review at the
ESA Technical and Engineering Center in Noordwijk, in the ESA/NASA meets-or-
exceeds meetings, with National Space Development Agency of Japan in the Redundancy
Management Panel, and with CSA at numerous requirements and design reviews of the
Space Station Remote Manipulator and the Special Purpose Dextrous Manipulator. The
R&M section has many contacts within the IPs organizations which allows it to have
quick and effective communications with the IPs.
The Vitro R&M support team had extensive interface in the SSF program, including
organization, levels, management structure, and a working relationship with key
personnel at NASA Headquarters Code Q, all the Work Package centers and prime
contractors, the Space Station Engineering and Integration Contractor (SSEIC), KSC,
and the IPs. SSF experience included hands-on development and analyses dealing with
requirements, documents, controls, and configuration management procedures. The team
has thorough knowledge of the phased process of the SSF development, design review,
production, acceptance, verification, launch-to-orbit, and operation of the SSF over its
life span.
The entire reliability, maintainability, and verification assurance programs, including
those tasks of the Systems Engineering and Integration group, are well known, as is the
establishment of the requirements of SSP 30234, the FMEA/CIL requirements for Space
Station program, and the FMEA/CIL assessment activity in major design reviews. This
unique knowledge permitted Vitro to establish a history of proven R&M
accomplishments across the full spectrum of R&M engineering.
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Quality Assurance Support
Vitro Quality Assurance (QA) engineers supported the evolution of the SSF design and
program documentation through the continuous evaluation, assessment and independent
oversight of requirements traceability to the manufacturer level; Engineering Change
Packages (ECPs) and CRs; design presentations and design data packages; technical
documentation; data system integrity and capabilities; and WP Centers/IPs/Prime
Contractors/KSC operations and procedures.
Vitro QA engineers supported the goal of advancement of world class QA principles and
techniques by developing and maintaining QA program requirements through the
initiation of program CRs and formulation of CEs). The QA Engineers supported the
SSFPO S&PA Office in the maintenance of the following program baselined documents
for which the office is the book manager: _ _
• SSP 30000, Section 9, "Program Definition Requirements Document."
SSP 30223 "Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System Requirements for the
Space Station Program."
• SSP 30521 "Safety and Product Assurance Audit Survey Plan."
SSP 30523 Safety and Product Assurance Information Planning Group (IPG)
Overview Document."
SSP 30524 "Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) System
Requirements Definition Document (RDD).
Vitro QA engineers actively and intensely participated in SSFP, WP Center, Prime
Contractor, KSC, and IP design reviews of flight hardware/software, ground support
equipment, data systems, engineering support centers, and processing facilities. The QA
staff attended design presentations, performed assessment of designs, reviewed design
documentation, developed RID reports, and participated on design review teams to
disposition RIDS. Through these activities, the QA staff ensured that program QA
requirements are incorporated throughout program/center/company specifications and
standards. To enhance design review productivity, the QA staff utilized the Automated
Requirements Management System (ARMS) to verify requirements traceability and the
Automated RID Tracking System (ARTS) to track RID dispositions.
Vitro QA engineers ensured that program requirements were incorporated in and
properly flowed down to all applicable lower level documents, standards, and
specifications. Vitro engineers supported the Configuration Management Office, as a
representative of the S&PA Office, on all Requirements Traceability Audits.
Requirements traceability was also accomplished during evaluations of CRs and by
participation in design reviews and various working groups. Additionally, the QA staff
ensured that all new requirements were verifiable and that the requirements identified in
ARMS were incorporated in the Master Verification Data Base (MVDB).
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Vitro QA engineers performed special assessments and analyses upon request of the
S&PA Office. The QA staff assessed the adequacy of the records retention program of
all SSFP Participants (SSFPPs); identified issues with the definition of high strength
fasteners throughout NASA and the aerospace industry; performed comparisons of
terminology between the NASA SSFP and the ESA Columbus Program; conducted
reviews of NASA workmanship standards; assessed the quality program of WP Centers in
preparation for S&PA audits; identified issues with the use of conflicting units
conversions by NASA and IP; assessed the adequacy and implementation of
Fastener/Quick Disconnects/Electrical Connectors requirements on the program;
evaluated the compatibility of NHB 5300.4 (1D-2) and SSP 30000 Section 9, Chapter 4.0
requirements; and reviewed numerous engineering analyses. Vitro QA engineers actively
participated in the QA Technical Interchange Meetings (TIMs) and presented results
and overviews of its subject activities.
Vitro OA engineers supported development and maintenance of QA associated SSF
programwide data bases through participation in Joint Application Development (JAD)
conferences, TMIS Application Technical Reviews, TMIS Branch level reviews, TMIS
Operations Readiness Reviews, TMIS Control Boards, and various other working groups.
Vitro QA engineers worked with program participants to establish data collection system
business processes, process work flow, business priorities, data element needs, and data
requirements. In conjunction with the NASA Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR),
IBM, Boeing, and TMIS, Vitro QA engineers developed user scenarios, data models,
entity relationship diagrams, process decomposition diagrams, and data tables. Vitro QA
engineers conducted user acceptance testing of data base functionality and user
interfaces and reviewed user documentation for accuracy and comprehensiveness. Vitro
QA engineers evaluated the Requirements Definition Documents for most TMIS data
systems for S&PA related data processing impacts and acted as the representative for the
S&PA Office on the development of the Test, Operations, Maintenance Requirements
and Specifications (TOMRS) system.
Vitro QA engineers supported the NASA OPR on the development, evolution, and
maintenance of the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) System and
Data System (PDS). The Vitro QA engineers identified and defined user requirements,
performed system assessments, conducted user acceptance testing, assisted in
development of CRs, assisted in disposition of CEs, evaluated design approaches, and
coordinated activities of the PRACA development team. Vitro QA engineers
coordinated and participated in PRACA JAD conferences, PRACA Process
Improvement Team (PPIT) meetings, PRACA Design Review Team (DRT) meetings,
and various telecons. Vitro QA engineers assisted in the maintenance and evolution of
SSP 30223, ,Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System Requirements for the
Space Station Program," and SSP 30524, "Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
(PRACA) System Requirements Definition Document (RDD)." Vitro QA engineers
supported the NASA OPR at the TMIS Control Board (TCB) and SSCB and played an
important role in PRACA meet-or-exceed evaluations of the NASDA, ESA, and CSA.
Vitro QA engineers performed extensive data element comparisons and business process
assessments for the meet or exceed evaluations for both the NASDA and ESA. Vitro
QA engineers also played a significant role in assessing the feasibility of adapting and
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converting the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Space Shuttle (SS) PRACA process to utilize
the SSFP PDS. Vitro QA engineers assisted in the development of Nonconformance
Reporting (NCR) capabilities, In-Flight Anomaly (IFA) reporting, and Corrective Action
Assistance Request (CAAR) processing capabilities in the SSFP PDS. Vitro QA
engineers supported the development of future capabilities, such as problem trending
and analysis.
The Vitro QA engineers supported verification activities through the review of the
program verification requirements in SSP 30000, Section 12, "Space Station Program
Master Verification Requirements"; SSP 30467, Volume II, "Space Station Program
Master Verification Requirements: Master Verification Implementation Requirements";
and SSP 30468, Volume II, "Space Station Combined Elements and Integrated Systems
Process Requirements: Combined Elements and Integrated Systems Verification
Implementation Requirements." Through various means, Vitro QA engineers assured
that verifii.'dtion responsibilities are considered and planned by all program participants.
Vitro QA engineers supported various verification working groups and meetings such as
the Program Master Verification Requirement (PMVR) review and the Stage
Verification Working Group.
Software Product Assurance
The Vitro Software Product Assurance (SPA) engineers actively supported evolution of
SSF program software documentation based on requirements of SSP 30000, Program
Definition and Requirements Document, Section 9, Product Assurance Requirements,
Paragraph 5, Software Product Assurance, in support of the SSF Level II SPA office.
This was accomplished through participation (via independent assessment) in the
development and implementation of software requirements on the program, and the
review of draft documents to ensure traceability of programmatic S&PA requirements.
Vitro SPA engineers assured that software product assurance concerns were addressed in
software documentation. Vitro SPA engineers coordinated with other SSF directorate
activities, including IPs, to review and integrate changes to requirements, design, and
verification/test documentation. Vitro SPA engineers performed research using various
documents from NASA, American Institute Aeronautics and Astronautics, Federal
Aviation Administration, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, private
industry etc., in order to utilize the latest "state-of-the-art" techniques and information.
The Level II SPA activity was recognized as the software management focal point for
issues related to software safety, requirements verifiability, and other issues associated
with software. Vitro SPA engineers established sound working relationships through
interface and coordination with Level I, Level II, WP, IP, and contractor and
subcontractor personnel, to derive 'real issues' and bring them to management's
attention.
Specific examples of direct SSF program S&PA participation include SSF program
reviews and performance of review-related tasks, including:
• Evaluation of program requirements and IP "meet-or-exceed" requirements.
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Proactive engineering support in Requirements Traceability Audits conducted for
the purpose of evaluating traceability or flowdown of requirements to the Work
Package Centers and CSA and their major contractors and the submittal of Audit
Evaluation Reports.
Engineering assessment of Level A Integrated Flight Software Architecture
Requirements to assure that the Fault Detection Identification and Reconfiguration
requirements meet the criteria for catastrophic and critical hazards for time-critical
events.
Participation in industry and government research related to Software Reliability;
provided suggestions to the program on a consistent approach for software
reliability on the program.
Active involvement in the Software Fault Analysis Working Group and the
finalization of the Software Fault Analysis Plan.
Evaluation and review of major contractor SPA plans for compliance with
requirements in Section 9, DR SSQ-SPA-001.
• Active engagement in TIMs with NASA Headquarters and WP Centers.
Vitro SPA engineers were actively engaged in the NASDA Software Design Review and
developed RIDs in support of the program effort. Especially of note was the RID that
precipitated the NASDA SPA TIM, involving the identification of deficiencies in the
NASDA SPA plan that did not meet the intent of DR SSQ-SPA-001.
Vitro SPA engineers were actively involved in the development, evaluation, or support of
ongoing engineering efforts in CFR; Level II SPA plan; safety definitions working group;
PRACA software non-conformance issues; software metrics; Ada coding standards; and
scope of Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) activities.
Vitro SPA engineers supported all NASA software assurance activities, including
developing documents, defining assurance activities, and supporting the NASA Software
Steering Committee. Documents that Vitro S&PA had a significant role in developing
included NMI 2410.10, "NASA Software Management, Assurance and Engineering
Policy"; NASA-STD-2201-93, "Software Assurance Standard; SMPA-GB-A201, Software
Assurance Guidebook"; and SMAP-GB-A301, "Software Quality Assurance Audits
Guidebook." Vitro also participated in the development of the Implementation Plan for
the IV&V Facility in Fairmont, WV.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that NASA Headquarters develop, in conjunction with all NASA
Centers, a set of Agencywide Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
(SRM&QA) requirements documents or handbooks that would apply to every NASA
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program, project, and organization. The requirements document should standardize
every aspect of the total SRM&QA program but yet allow for tailoring or deviating in
certain areas for special conditions. The Agencywide requirements concept would
eliminate the need to develop requirements for each NASA program and allow
personnel to easily work across programs.
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